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1 Background  
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 This review presents evidence on the role of clinical engagement in primary care-led commissioning and 
how this has contributed to the delivery of health care services. The main aim was to examine the nature 
of clinical engagement / involvement in the various primary care-led commissioning models that were 
introduced into the National Health Service (NHS) since 1991. The review forms part of a suite of 
research being undertaken by the Policy Research Unit in Commissioning and the Healthcare System 
and presents evidence to inform and support the Department of Health’s policy on commissioning. The 
focus of the review was agreed with the Department in April 2011 in response to proposals for developing 
General Practitioner (GP) consortia as defined in Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS (DH 2010).  
1.1.2 The key objectives of this review are to examine the evidence from previous approaches to clinically-led 
primary care commissioning in the English NHS on: 
 What kinds of roles clinicians played in commissioning 
 What was the nature of clinical engagement in the commissioning process 
 How much control and influence did clinicians have over commissioning decisions 
 The impact of clinical engagement on: 
 the ability to effect patterns of care including: changes in referrals to secondary care, 
impact on emergency admissions, service development (eg outreach clinics or changes 
in hospital and community services), and contracting. 
 changing primary care practice including prescribing and performance management. 
 quality and experience including improvements in waiting times, patient satisfaction, 
quality of care, the use of evidence (EBM) and improved information. 
 financial issues such as costs versus savings and the awareness of costs. 
 improved relationships within commissioning groups and with other agencies. 
1.1.3 The proposals in the White Paper outlined the commissioning role of proposed GP consortia (See 
Appendix 1) where it was argued that GP involvement would ensure that “ ... the redesign of patient 
pathways and local services is always clinically-led and based on more effective dialogue and 
partnership with hospital specialists. It will bring together responsibility for clinical decisions and for the 
financial consequences of these decisions. This will reinforce the crucial role that GPs already play in 
committing NHS resources through their daily clinical decisions – not only in terms of referrals and 
prescribing, but also how well they manage long-term conditions, and the accessibility of their services. It 
will increase efficiency, by enabling GPs to strip out activities that do not have appreciable benefits for 
patients’ health or healthcare.” (DH 2010: para. 4.4). 
1.1.4 Drawing on this vision our definition of primary care-led commissioning includes all commissioning 
approaches where GPs and other primary care clinicians took a lead role in commissioning decisions. In 
the context of the purchaser-provider split in the UK, it is everything about the relationship between 
purchasers and providers (or potential providers). This includes approaches where clinicians were 
involved in health needs assessment, service specification, setting quality standards, negotiating 
contracts and activity and controlling resources. The White Paper makes a specific reference to the need 
to learn from previous experience acknowledging that 
 “GP-led purchasing has history. Practice-based Commissioning was an attempt by the last Government 
to build on the successful parts of previous Conservative approaches, such as total purchasing pilots. 
There have been some examples of practice-based groups making progress, in spite of a flawed policy 
framework that confuses the respective responsibilities of GPs and PCTs, and fails to transfer real 
freedom and responsibility to GP practices. Our model is neither a recreation of GP fundholding nor a 
complete rejection of Practice-based Commissioning. Fundholding led to a two-tier NHS; and Practice-
based Commissioning never became a real transfer of responsibility. So we will learn from the past, 
and offer a clear way forward for GP consortia.” (DH 2010 4.5).  
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1.1.5 This review explores what happens, in different contexts, when GPs (or other clinicians) are involved in 
commissioning. The next sections briefly outline the development of primary care-led commissioning in 
England and the methods used for identifying and selecting relevant research to include within this 
review. Sections 2 and 3 detail the findings of the review. In Section 2 we examine evidence on clinical 
engagement and then in Section 3 we assess the impact of clinically-led commissioning. Drawing on the 
evidence identified Section 4 discusses the contribution of clinical engagement to achieving 
commissioning outcomes. Finally in the conclusion we identify key lessons and examine the implications 
of our findings for the future development of Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs).  
1.1.6 The review focuses upon evidence from the UK NHS, as we are interested in the specific context of UK 
primary care involvement in commissioning. Whilst we recognise that there are international examples of 
primary care clinicians engaged in purchasing decisions, these occur in a very different context, and fall 
outside the scope of this review. We have also not looked at the general evidence relating to 
Commissioning in the UK, as our focus here is on clinically-led commissioning. Evidence relating to such 
broader issues has been reviewed by Newman, Bangpan et al (2012), Similarly, we have not looked at 
initiatives to improve commissioning practice such as World-class Commissioning, because these 
initiatives were managerially led, with very little involvement of primary care clinicians. Finally, we have 
not explored the literature that purports to advise managers on ‘how to do’ commissioning, as this is 
rarely based upon empirical evidence and does not focus upon the role of clinicians.  
1.2 The development of primary care-led purchasing and commissioning in England 
1.2.1 The introduction of the internal market in 1990 led to a number of significant changes to the UK NHS. 
The Government’s proposals were set out in the White Paper Working for Patients (Department of Health 
1990) and led to the separation of District Health Authorities as funders of health care and the 
development of hospitals, community health and mental health services as health care providers.  It 
came at the same time that there was increasing policy interest in the role of primary care (Peckham and 
Exworthy 2003) and there was, therefore, a growing interest in exploring how the unique role of GPs 
practice - as managers and gatekeepers of patient care - could be harnessed within the new 
organisational arrangements for the NHS. Engaging GPs in service development and planning was seen 
as being of critical importance and from 1990 a number of approaches to engaging GPs and other 
primary care clinicians were developed starting with GP Fundholding and its multi-fund and non budget-
holding variants in the early 1990s. Since then a number of organisational models have been 
experimented with including Total Purchasing (TP), GP Commissioning Groups, Primary Care Groups 
and Trusts (PCG/Ts), Practice-based Commissioning (PbC) and now CCGs (See Figure 1). 
1.2.2 The schemes varied in their organisational structure, degree of autonomy, governance and accountability 
arrangements and the extent of clinical engagement. However, the experience of these previous 
commissioning models provides useful insights into the role of clinical engagement and how different 
degrees of engagement impacted on the way these organisations worked and what they achieved. 
Before examining the evidence the following sections provide a brief overview of the development of 
primary care-led commissioning models.  
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
1.2.3 GP Fundholding  
Fundholding was a voluntary scheme that was introduced in 1991 as part of the development of an 
internal market in the UK NHS (Department of Health 1989). It was initially seen as a minor innovation 
introduced as a way of improving local secondary care responsiveness, where GPs acted as advocates 
for patient care. It later became a centre piece of government policy reflecting the growing policy 
importance of primary care. The key aims of this past scheme reflect current (2012) policy: 
“The scheme stems from an acknowledgement that by virtue of their clinical behaviour – making 
referrals and prescribing drugs – GPs influence important areas of NHS expenditure, and that 
their closeness to patients means that they are uniquely placed to act as purchasers on their 
patients' behalf. Fundholding aims to make GPs aware of the financial consequences of their 
clinical decisions and, by giving them an incentive to make and spend audited savings, to 
encourage them to consider the costs of different courses of action. The expectation is that this 
will lead to more economic and efficient use of hospital and community health services, and 
more rational prescribing. Giving GPs the power to contract with providers, and the freedom to 
choose between them, is intended to give providers – particularly hospitals and their consultants 
– an incentive to listen more carefully to what GPs have to say and to take steps to improve the 
quality of their services (Audit Commission 1996: pp5-6). 
Fundholding enabled GP practices, subject to list size (of which the threshold was progressively reduced) 
and technical capability, to hold a budget which could be used to purchase a defined list of hospital and 
community services. These services included: inpatient, outpatient, direct access, diagnostic and 
community nursing services; the cost of pharmaceuticals and appliances prescribed by the practice; and 
payment for non-medical staff employed by the practice (Glennerster 1994).  In addition, practices 
received funds to improve their information systems and a management allowance. Following the entry of 
300 practices in the first wave in 1991, the scheme grew at a prolific rate with 2,221 funds covering 41% 
of the population in England and Wales by 1995, although regional variations were substantial (Audit 
Commission 1995). During the lifetime of the scheme (1991 to 1997), new waves were approved on an 
annual basis and there were seven in total (Moon, Mohan et al 2002). Fundholders (FHs) operated either 
as single practices or in multi-fund groups.  
Figure 2:  A history of GP commissioning
Timeline
1991
1995
1997
1999
2005
2010
2011
Introduction of purchaser-provider spilt (trusts & HAs)
GP Fundholding (a parallel innovation) 
Total purchasing- an extension of FH (3 year pilot)
Change of government. Labour outlines plans to end FH and 
move to GP Commissioning Groups
Locality commissioning
GP commissioning 
Range of different approaches to 
commissioning (GPs at fulcrum of 
emerging relationships)
FH officially abolished, Primary Care Groups established 
with aim progressing to Primary Care Trusts
Practice-based commissioning introduced 
Change government. Conservative proposals include   
abolishing PCTs and replacing with GP consortia
Pathfinder clinical commissioning groups
Figure 1: A history of GP commissioning 
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1.2.4 Alternatives to GP Fundholding 1991-97 
In response to fundholding, a plethora of alternative commissioning models emerged. These were 
generally developed as partnerships between non-fundholding GPs and their constituent health 
authorities (Glennerster, Cohen et al. 1998). By 1997, around 20 variants of commissioning models 
involving primary care clinicians were reportedly operating (Smith, Barnes et al. 1998). These alternative 
models were generally based on locality structures grouping GP practices by geographical area.  
1.2.5 Total Purchasing  
TP was a scheme whereby FHs could volunteer to receive a delegated budget from their local Health 
Authority (HA) in order to purchase potentially all hospital and community health services for their 
patients. The idea was first developed locally by GPs who were keen to extend the range of services they 
were able to purchase as FHs. Following the establishment of four ‘pioneer’ Total Purchasing Pilots 
(TPPs) in 1994, a national scheme was launched (Mays 1996).  Regional Health Authorities sought to 
identify groups of GPs interested in becoming pilots. Leese and colleagues found that, in practice, the 
impetus for the majority of projects in their study  came from either the GPs themselves or from GP/HA 
collaborations (Leese and Mahon 1999). In 1995, the first wave of 53 pilots began (Mays 1996) with a 
lifespan of three years - one preparatory year and two years of live purchasing. A second wave of 34 
pilots began live purchasing in 1997 (Malbon, Goodwin et al. 1998). Total Purchasing National Evaluation 
Team (TP-NET) conducted a before-and -after and comparative evaluation between October 1995 and 
September 1998 (Mays, 1996). All pilots were included in the evaluation, although some reports only 
focus on a subset of pilots. 
The name ‘total purchasing’ is misleading in terms of the scope of the scheme. Whilst pilots did have the 
freedom to purchase all hospital and community care for their patients, none of them did (Mays 1996; 
Malbon, Goodwin et al. 1998). The term selective purchasing has been used and is a more accurate way 
to describe the nature of the pilots. The decision to purchase selectively does not appear to have been 
imposed upon the pilots by the HA; rather, GPs constrained themselves. TPPs selected areas they were 
keen to influence and these tended to be either areas of local concern or areas where GPs had a specific 
interest. A mechanism existed whereby funding could be automatically returned to the HA. This process 
of ‘blocking back’ was exercised by most TPPs, typically in service areas where GPs lack confidence 
(Malbon, Goodwin et al. 1998). Alternatively co-purchasing arrangements were an option. GPs’ personal 
experience and awareness of specific local issues dictated purchasing priorities for both first and second 
wave TPPs. Projects strategically chose a few service areas to focus on where the need for change was 
clear, the workload would be manageable and the probability of success was high (ibid). This approach 
was practical, rather than ‘total’.   
1.2.6 GP Commissioning 
In June 1997, following the abolition of GP Fundholding, the Labour Government announced plans to 
pilot new approaches to the commissioning of health services and 40 general practitioner (GP) 
commissioning pilots were launched in April 1998. While the pilots pre-dated the ‘New NHS’ White Paper 
(NHS Executive 1997) they provided an opportunity for groups of general practices to trial aspects of new 
models of primary care led commissioning. The groups all assumed responsibility for an actual cash-
limited prescribing budget and were expected to work in partnership with nurses, social services, and the 
public (NHS Executive 1998).  They also assumed a varied range of other commissioning 
responsibilities, such as actual or notional hospital and community health services budgets, and 
elements of general medical services budgets. In December 1997, the government then announced it 
would be establishing a national network of Primary Care Groups (PCGs) (Department of Health 1997) 
and the GP commissioning groups provided early lessons for the establishment and implementation of 
PCGs. 
1.2.7 Primary Care Groups and Trusts 
Primary Care Groups (PCGs) were established in 1999 following the abolition of fundholding and as the 
TPPs neared the end of their life. PCGs brought together all GPs in a locality along with community 
nurses, social services, the HA and lay representatives (Audit commission 2000). The Labour 
government at the time declared that local doctors and nurses would drive the organisations and GP 
practices were viewed as the building blocks. Four levels of PCGs, each allowing differing degrees of 
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autonomy were outlined by the 1997 White Paper. The level would depend on existing skill, expertise, 
and GP involvement in the existing commissioning models in a locality. At the bottom end (level one) a 
group of GPs and community nurses would act as an advisory group to the HA. The ultimate plan was for 
all organisations to develop into an independent trust comprised of GPs and nurses (level four) whereby 
they commission primary, secondary and community health services for the local population. These 
organisations were to be called Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) (Peckham and Exworthy 2003). However, in 
2000 The Government announced that in England all commissioners should become PCTs which would 
have a clinical committee - the Professional Executive Committee (PEC) chaired by a GP and a Trust 
Board comprising executive directors (including the PEC Chair, other clinicians and managers) and lay 
non-executive directors and a lay chairperson (Department of Health 2000). By 2010 there were 152 
PCTs and in many trusts the PEC had ceased to have the degree of importance envisaged in earlier 
guidance. 
 
1.2.8 Practice-based Commissioning 
In order to address the perceived lack of GP engagement in the PCT commissioning process, a scheme 
named ‘Practice-based Commissioning’ was introduced in 2005. Volunteering GP practices received an 
indicative budget with which to commission and provide services. The scope of this budget was not fully 
specified by the Department of Health, but official guidance suggested that, as a minimum, it should 
include: hospital activity covered by the ‘payment by results’ regime (ie hospital outpatient, inpatient and 
emergency care); community services; mental health; and prescribing. Although the scheme was 
voluntary, the successful enrolment of practices in the scheme became a key performance indicator for 
PCTs. In order to bring this about, PCTs were empowered to offer practices a direct incentive to join in 
the form of a payment called a ‘Directed Enhanced Service’ (DES). As a result, by late 2006 PCTs were 
able to claim almost 100% coverage of practices participating in a PbC. The initial guidance relating to 
the scheme implied that practices would undertake PbC alone, but in fact most practices joined together 
with others to form groups, often known as ‘consortia’ or ‘localities’ (Checkland, Coleman et al. 2008). A 
survey carried out in 2007 found that the range of size of PbC consortia was from population coverage of 
10,000 to 480,000 persons, with a mean population size of 82,271 (Coleman, Harrison et al. 2007). PbC 
groups were hosted and supported by the local PCT, and, whilst nominal coverage was 100%, 
enthusiasm for the scheme varied between PCTs; as a result, engagement and enthusiasm varied 
across England (Audit Commission 2007).  
1.3 Methods 
1.3.1 This review builds on an National Institute of Health Research Service Delivery and Organisation 
programme -funded research project ‘Effective approaches to public sector commissioning: A systematic 
review of the research evidence’ undertaken by the Evidence for Policy and Practice Information and Co-
ordinating Centre (EPPI-Centre) at the Institute of Education between October 2009 and August 2010. 
The aim of the EPPI-Centre research was to ‘identify research evidence on commissioning or public 
service purchasing in the UK and other countries in order to investigate the factors which influence the 
impact of different approaches to public service purchasing and to identify lessons for health care 
commissioning and practice.’ 
1.3.2 Following an initial scoping exercise comprising of a literature review and a stakeholder survey, the 
Institute of Education research team conducted a  systematic search of the literature (mid-January to 
mid-February 2010). This search was carried out using multiple sources (13 electronic databases, over 
20 websites, Google and reference lists of reviews) in order to identify all possible empirical evidence 
(both published and unpublished) relevant to the scope of the review. Details of their search strategy and 
methodology can be found in their final report (Newman, Bangpan et al 2012. They identified 17,588 
citations which, through text mining, was shortlisted to shortlist 6,497 potentially relevant studies. From 
this 8,320 potential relevant titles and abstracts were screened and 1,402 full texts were reviewed 
ultimately leaving 600 studies for inclusion in their systematic map (database). This provided the core 
database for starting this systematic review.  
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1.3.3 Of the studies in the database, 446 were concerned with health (with the others focussing on social care 
and education). The titles of the ‘health’ references were screened and all studies conducted somewhere 
other than the UK were discarded. The remaining 339 references were entered into an Endnote library. 
We then conducted a search to expand and update the database identified from the EPPI-Centre review. 
1.3.4 An electronic literature search was conducted in ‘social policy and practice’, ‘econlit’, ‘Medline’, 
‘PsychINFO’ and ‘CINAHL’ following the same search strategy used by the EPPI-Centre (limited to 
publications from 2010 onwards)  in order to retrieve any studies published in the past year.  This was 
carried out in March 2011. In addition we hand-searched the following journals from 1991 (post 
Purchaser-Provider split) to the present day:  
The British Journal of General Practice  
The British Medical Journal  
Health Services Research and Policy. 
In addition hand searches of the bibliographies of a number of key reviews on primary care 
commissioning (see Appendix 2). 
1.3.5 A number of primary care-led commissioning schemes had formal evaluations (See Table 1). The 
evaluations of TPPs and GP Commissioning Groups were specific programmes funded by the 
Department of Health Policy Research Programme. Evaluations of PCGs and PbC were undertaken by 
the Department of Health-funded National Primary Care Research and Development Centre (NPCRDC) 
at the University of Manchester. The main reports, topic specific reports and other published papers from 
these evaluations are included in this review. 
 
Table 1 - Formal evaluation programmes of primary care-led commissioning schemes 
 
 Scheme  Evaluation team  Time frame  Main evaluation report? 
 Total Purchasing 
Pilots (TPP) 
 TP-Net led by the King’s 
Fund. 
 1995 to 1998  Yes (Wyke et al 1999; Mays et 
al 2001) and a number of topic 
specific reports 
 GP Commissioning  Health Services 
Management Centre, 
University of Birmingham 
 1997 to 1999 (when 
focus changed to 
PCG/Ts) 
 Yes (Smith 2000)   
 Primary Care 
Groups (PCGs) / 
Primary Care Trusts 
(PCTs) 
  
 National Primary Care 
Research and Development 
Centre, University of 
Manchester 
 Health Services 
Management Centre, 
University of Birmingham 
1999 - 2002 
 
 
From January 1999 until 
2000 12 case study 
PCG/Ts followed from 
original cohort of GP 
commissioning pilot 
groups 
 Yes (Tracker survey results x 
3) plus associated papers 
  
 Yes (Regen et al 2002) plus 
interim reports and papers 
 Practice-based 
Commissioning 
(PbC) 
 National Primary Care 
Research and Development 
Centre, University of 
Manchester 
   Yes (Coleman et al 2009) plus 
papers. 
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1.3.6 The websites of the institutions known to be involved in these national evaluations of previous 
commissioning models were also searched: 
 The King’s Fund  National Evaluation of the TPP Projects 
 Health Services Management Centre (HSMC) (University of Birmingham) - National 
Evaluation of GP commissioning groups 
 NPCRDC - (University of Manchester) National evaluation of PbC and PCGs  
1.3.7 From these searches, 175 references were identified which appeared from the title to be potentially 
relevant to the review (ie were about commissioning in health care) and did not appear in the original 339 
references extracted from the EPPI-Centre database. These were added to the Endnote library. Where 
possible, abstracts were obtained for the 514 selected references. A team of 6 reviewers viewed the 
abstracts. Each abstract was independently reviewed by three reviewers (See Figure 2 for an overview of 
the review process). The decision to obtain the full-text was guided by a general view that commissioning 
was conceptualised relating to everything about the relationship between purchasers and providers (or 
potential providers) and met the following broad criteria: 
 Secondary, tertiary and community care (including mental health and other specialised 
services), primary care service developments (eg outreach clinics, general practice services, 
prescribing) to be included and other primary care (medical, dentistry, ophthalmology and 
pharmacy) excluded 
 Must say something about clinician involvement 
 UK studies only 
 Must be post-1991 (purchaser-provider split)  
 Was an empirical study 
1.3.8 Where enough information was available, a decision was made to either discard the study or to keep and 
obtain the full text. In some cases, there were discrepancies between reviewers. In these instances, 
where only one of the reviewers deemed a reference relevant, it was decided to obtain the full text. 
Where enough information was not available from the abstract (or if abstract was not easily available) 
studies were kept and the full text obtained. Full texts were obtained for the 288 references deemed to be 
potentially relevant to the study question. Of these 218 were deemed suitable to include in the review 
(see Appendix 3). Full text articles were obtained in printed and electronic file form either as a PDF or 
scanned from the printed article. 
1.3.9 We designed a data extraction tool (see Appendix 2) and piloted its use with one researcher reading a 
small number of papers and then discussed and agreed principles for data extraction. Each full text 
paper was then read by one researcher with a secondary researcher checking the extracted data. One 
researcher (RM) reviewed all papers. Drawing on the data in the extraction forms we constructed a 
number of evidence matrices and identified themes drawing on our key research questions and key 
issues emerging from the data. In the sections that follow, the inferences drawn are based upon a 
comprehensive assessment of all relevant references. In order to make the review more readable, we 
have not put every single reference in the text as, for example, many statements are underpinned by as 
many as 10 or 15 papers. Listing all of these would have made the review difficult to read. The text 
therefore contains the key references under each heading, with all 218 papers listed in appendix 3. 
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Figure  1.2: Overview of selection process for review
1. Updated search
2. Searched bibliographies of key reviews
3. 
4. Searched key websites
175 potentially relevant 
studies identified
600 studies in IOE 
database
446 studies 
about health
339 studies focus 
on UK
514 abstracts
Inclusion criteria
• definition of commissioning
• UK studies only
• post 1991 (p-p split)
• only empirical work
• must involve clinicians
• secondary, tertiary and 
community care (excluding 
primary care)
288 full texts
218
 
 
Figure 2: Overview of selection process for review 
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2 Nature of clinical engagement/involvement in commissioning models 
2.1 Introduction 
2.1.1 In this section we examine the nature of clinical engagement in commissioning. The aim is to understand 
what kinds of engagement were undertaken by clinicians in the various models of primary care-led 
commissioning. Since the introduction of the purchaser provider split into the NHS two decades ago, 
there have been numerous attempts to involve GPs and other clinicians in commissioning. In order to 
understand the effect this clinical input has had, it is necessary to assess the nature of clinical 
engagement in the commissioning process and from our analysis of the literature, we have sought to 
determine how much control and influence clinicians had over commissioning decisions under the 
various schemes to date.  
2.1.2 There is no clear definition of ‘clinical engagement’ in commissioning. Drawing on the policy goals for 
clinical engagement and discussions of primary care-led commissioning in the literature we identified 
several key elements that appear to define ‘clinical engagement’. Firstly, what are the attitudes of 
clinicians towards the scheme and what are their motivations for joining? Secondly there is the question 
of leadership. For example, what kind of leadership positions do clinicians hold within a commissioning 
organisation, and further, how much influence do these clinicians have? Thirdly, what is the nature of 
linkage between the clinical leadership and the wider clinical partnership? Fourthly, what level of control 
do clinicians assume over a budget and the contracting process? Finally, it is necessary to assess the 
perceived influence of the commissioning organisation over other bodies with which it interacts, for 
example the HA or provider trusts. Taken together, these elements can enable us to draw an overall 
picture of the extent of clinical engagement within different initiatives. Further, we can explore how and 
why it varied between and within commissioning models.    
2.2 Motivations for joining and attitudes towards the scheme 
2.2.1 Each of the different models of primary care-led commissioning (except for PCGs and PCTs) were 
introduced in similar ways with calls for volunteers or ‘pilots’ and then gradually expanded. Practices and 
GPs were not, therefore, required to participate and those that did choose to join schemes did so at 
different stages. Motivations for joining the fundholding scheme could be broadly categorised into two 
groups - positive and negative. ‘Positive’ motivations were seen more commonly in the first wave and 
were primarily concerned with improving the quality of service for patients (Glennerster 1994). This group 
of GPs were keen to participate actively in the innovation and believed fundholding was a vehicle through 
which they could break the mould, affect change and ultimately improve patient services (Duckworth, 
Day et al. 1992 ; Coleshill, Goldie et al. 1998). Those with ‘negative’ motivations were concerned with 
preserving their perceived threatened autonomy, not missing out on any financial inducements, and 
getting on the bandwagon for fear of being left behind (Duckworth, Day et al. 1992; Glennerster 1994; 
Coleshill, Goldie et al. 1998; Surender and Fitzpatrick 1999).  
2.2.2 Ennew and colleagues termed the first group of GPs, who sought to exploit the opportunities created by 
fundholding, ‘true entrepreneurs’, and the latter, who simply recognised fundholding as a trend for the 
future and were essentially pushed into the scheme, ‘reluctant entrepreneurs’. ‘Partial entrepreneurs’ had 
mixed motives and featured somewhere in between (Ennew, Whynes et al. 1998). The more 
‘entrepreneurial’ the senior GP’s beliefs were, then the greater the likelihood that the GP’s practice 
became a FH, and did so in an earlier wave (Whynes, Ennew et al. 1999). While most studies of 
fundholding focused on lead GPs, Surender and colleagues’ study of six fundholding practices atypically 
included rank and file GPs in the interview sample.  They found stark differences in the enthusiasm and 
motivation of GPs (leads vs rank and file) within the practices. Initially, many of the non-leads were either 
actively opposed or indifferent to the idea (Surender and Fitzpatrick 1999). 
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2.2.3 Those GP Fundholders (GPFHs) who applied to become Total Purchasers viewed the concept of TP as 
exciting, offering the opportunity to be innovative. GPs interviewed in the TPP evaluation reported that 
they thought TP would provide much greater freedom than standard fundholding (Leese and Mahon 
1999). Yet the financial incentives to join the scheme were weak and GP participation appears to have 
been driven mainly by the interest of GPs in the specific local developments being pursued by TPPs  
(Wyke, Mays et al. 2003). 
2.2.4 In contrast, the motivation for GPs to engage in the alternative commissioning models that emerged was 
generally driven by a shared hostility towards fundholding. This was partly due to a belief that GP 
Fundholding had created a two tier system. As a result a number of local non-FH GPs and their 
constituent health authorities came together across the country (Glennerster, Cohen et al. 1998). Some 
of these locality approaches were largely driven  local health authorities, but others developed out of a 
genuine enthusiasm amongst non-fundholders to find an alternative. In general the evidence does not 
suggest that these GPs were driven by a strong desire to engage in commissioning processes; rather, it 
was their intention to mitigate what they saw as the harmful effects of fundholding and demonstrate the 
potential of other alternatives that drove their involvement. 
2.2.5 While these earlier approaches were based on GPs voluntarily joining schemes, the development of 
PCGs marked a change in approach as membership of the local PCG was mandatory. Similarly, with the 
transition to PCTs practices were not consulted or engaged in the organisational change. One postal 
survey of all lead GPs and managers of TPPs regarding their views on PCGs revealed that some staff 
were experiencing ‘change fatigue’, having previously been involved in both fundholding and TP (Malbon 
and Mays 1998). 
2.2.6 PCGs were only developed in England. However, in Scotland similar mandatory changes were being 
undertaken with the imposition of new structures for engaging primary care. During the reorganisation of 
primary care and development of Local Health Care Cooperatives GPs felt they were excluded from the 
decision-making process and not sufficiently involved in the consultation phase (Coleshill, Goldie et al. 
1998). Having enjoyed the freedom under fundholding, they were unhappy about the return to the old 
style of central decision-making that was perceived as top-down control, constraining development and 
disheartened because all the hard work they had put into fundholding appeared to be in vain (ibid).  
2.2.7 While engagement in PCGs was mandatory the introduction of PbC was again on a voluntary basis. 
Similarly to fundholding practices, they were heavily incentivised to take at least a nominal part in PbC 
(through a Direct Enhanced Service payment in the GMS contract). This payment was made when a 
practice formally signed up to join, and required practices to do little more than signal their intention to 
take part (Checkland, Coleman et al. 2008). In addition to this, PCTs were also required to offer further 
incentive schemes which rewarded active participation. Such schemes included, for example, payment 
for meeting prescribing targets, payments for staying within the indicative budget or payments for 
participating in meetings and events (Coleman, Harrison et al. 2007; Checkland, Coleman et al. 2008). 
Payments made under these schemes were direct payments that could be taken as income. Studies of 
PbC demonstrated that such schemes were effective in generating activity by practices (Coleman, 
Harrison et al. 2007; Peretz and Bright 2007; Checkland, Coleman et al. 2008). In addition, PbC carried 
with it the incentive that practices (or groups of practices) could have access to 70% of any savings 
made on their indicative budgets. This money could not be taken as practice income, but had to be 
invested in the development of new services. The extent to which such savings could be realised (and 
therefore the extent of the incentive offered) depended upon the scope of budgets that had been 
delegated (Checkland, Coleman et al. 2011). 
2.2.8 In addition to these direct incentives to join PbC, studies suggested that some GPs were significantly 
motivated by the possibility of using PbC to effect change to services in their localities and enthused by 
the possibilities for collaboration that it provided (Coleman, Harrison et al. 2007; Checkland, Coleman et 
al. 2008; Curry, Goodwin et al. 2008; Coleman, Checkland et al. 2009; Wells 2010). However, there was 
also evidence that GPs were concerned as to the possible longevity of the scheme, with some GPs 
expressing the opinion that there was little point in actively engaging because it was likely that, like 
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previous schemes such as TPP, PbC would soon be abolished (Curry, Goodwin et al. 2008; Coleman, 
Checkland et al. 2009; Wood and Curry 2009). 
2.2.9 Unlike some previous schemes aimed at generating clinical engagement in commissioning, PbC did not 
provide additional funding for management costs. Management support was provided by PCTs, and 
there was some evidence that where PCTs demonstrated a greater commitment to providing such 
support this could have a beneficial effect on practices’ engagement with PbC (Audit Commission 2007; 
Coleman, Checkland et al. 2009). Finally, a number of studies suggested that the past history of GP 
commissioning in an area could have a significant impact upon how PbC was perceived and how GPs 
engaged with it. In particular, past experiences of Fundholding and PCGs were found to cast long 
shadows in terms of both positive and negative attitudes to commissioning, and more specifically in 
relation to how practices might be grouped for commissioning purposes (Peretz and Bright 2007; 
Coleman, Checkland et al. 2010). 
2.2.10 In summary, each new scheme generated differing levels of engagement and this engagement was 
driven by differing motivations depending upon the focus of the scheme. For example, fundholding 
enabled ‘entrepreneurial’ GPs to generate investment in their practices, whilst engagement in alternative 
schemes tended to be driven by hostility to fundholding. Overall, most schemes were led by a relatively 
small number of enthusiasts, with ‘rank and file’ GPs exhibiting varying degrees of engagement from 
acquiescence to (in some cases) outright hostility. There was some evidence of ‘change fatigue’, with 
studies of PbC (Coleman, Checkland et al. 2009) showing that clinicians drew lessons from the abolition 
of previous schemes (eg TPP), regarding the new scheme as potentially temporary. 
2.3 Clinical leadership and influence (within the organisation) 
2.3.1 Central to all models of primary care-led commissioning is the concept of clinical leadership. In GP 
fundholding the hierarchical structure of general practice reportedly allowed the lead GP and business 
manager to take decisions on behalf of the practice. These actors assumed the majority of responsibility 
of running the scheme, including budgeting and contracting tasks and liaising with the consortium board, 
HA and local providers (Surender and Fitzpatrick 1999). A small descriptive study recounting the early 
implementation of fundholding in a single practice found that whilst a business manager could take on a 
significant proportion of administrative tasks such as organising the budget and negotiating contracts, 
GPs (especially the senior partner) had to play a major management role because they were seen as 
responsible for giving direction by the support staff (Bain 1992). Essentially, within the fundholding 
scheme, GPs were the undisputed leaders. Lead GPs were closely and directly involved in decision-
making. Fundholding made it easy for GPs to ‘do things’ as they had greater autonomy over the areas 
they held budgetary responsibility for. 
2.3.2 However, Cowton and Drake (1999a) found that the decision about who would take the lead came 
second to the decision to join the scheme. With many practices demonstrating a lack of positive support 
for fundholding, they found that a nomination for lead was not always forthcoming. Further, where the 
motivations for joining were positive, this did not ensure any one senior partner was enthusiastic to take 
the lead. Whilst many GPs accepted rather than took the lead the same study also revealed that doctors 
grew to appreciate a management role once having experienced it (Cowton and Drake 1999a). Once 
established in the scheme, enthusiasm amongst ‘GP managers’ increased. This increased enthusiasm 
was attributed to having more control and GPs feeling that they held autonomy and power (Cowton and 
Drake 1999b). On the other hand, there were clearly a group of activists or ‘true entrepreneurs’, 
especially in the first wave, eager to assume a lead role. For example, a survey of GPs in one regional 
HA area found that practices with the more entrepreneurial GP leaders were particularly active (Whynes, 
Ennew et al. 1999). The enthusiasm held by these GPs was possibly related to the opportunities the 
scheme gave for proactive action.   
2.3.3 GPs also took leadership roles in non-fundholding commissioning models. In a national survey in 1996, 
health authorities (94/100 responded) were found to obtain medical advice for the commissioning 
process through one of three broad approaches (BMA 1997).  ‘Locality-based advice’ or ‘locality 
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commissioning’ occurred where potentially all local GPs had the opportunity to meet regularly to discuss 
matters related to secondary care purchasing. Consensus opinion was then transmitted to the HA. 
‘Group based advice’ was similar to the locality approach but the advice came from a group of 
representatives of the GP community. The third avenue for involving GPs was ‘centrally based’. Local 
doctors were nominated or appointed directly to an identified decision-making body. Some health 
authorities appointed independent GP advisors. In all three models, it is apparent that clinicians had an 
advisory role rather than a leadership position.  
2.3.4 Similar results were seen in a further postal questionnaire involving 28 health authorities; the majority of 
models identified GPs as acting in an advisory capacity. Only one scheme was described as ‘GP-
dominated’ (Hudson Hart, Drummond et al. 1999). In some areas GPs themselves took the initiative to 
instigate collaboration with their HA (Black, Birchall et al. 1994). Such schemes were labelled as ‘GP 
commissioning’ and considered to be bottom-up in their approach but were different to the national GP 
commissioning pilots that were introduced by the Labour Government in 1997. In a self-reported study 
the Nottingham non-FHs found that 200 GPs (67% of all Nottingham GPs) supported the scheme. In this 
example the HA paid a sessional rate to a working group to advise on purchasing (ibid). The group 
attribute a number of successes to this arrangement but it is not possible to determine the extent of GP 
influence over the HA decision-making process from this report.  
2.3.5 The BMA survey of health authorities attempted to assess the level of impact that medical advice had on 
the commissioning process. Nearly half the respondents (45%) reported that the advice was ‘taken into 
consideration’ by the HA, as opposed to actively acted upon (9%). Interestingly, Local Medical 
Committees were more optimistic about GP influence, with 69% believing the advice was considered 
(BMA 1997).   
2.3.6 An evaluation of 13 locality commissioning groups in Avon found that participation in these groups was 
high (82% of practices were represented at meetings on average), although this was variable. Only 41% 
of non-lead GPs and 67% of lead GPs, however, felt their group had influenced the HA. This was 
consistent with the views of the HA link staff, of whom, 62% felt this was true. Further almost all GPs, 
both lead and non-leads, wanted more influence (Hine and Bachmann 1997). The main barriers identified 
to greater influence were lack of time and information; lack of cohesion between practices; and 
ambivalence towards locality commissioning in the HA. It was felt that a more structured scheme with 
better funding would yield more influence. 8/13 lead GPs felt the scheme was not sustainable and were 
frustrated by uninterested GPs, the slow pace of change, lack of leadership and work overload (ibid). 
Glennerster et al’s (1998) study of six ‘alternatives to fundholding’ concluded that the effectiveness of 
these schemes, in terms of engaging GPs, depended on the extent to which HAs were prepared to act as 
the GPs agents. Where they were committed to this role, GPs remained with the scheme. Where they did 
not, GPs tended to move onto actual fundholding (ibid).  
2.3.7 There was no organisational template for TP and as a result there was substantial variety between the 
pilots, in terms of both organisational structure and the nature of the interaction between GPs and their 
constituent HA (Mays 1996). Although every TPP was technically a sub-committee of the HA there was a 
continuum which ran from top-down HA-led projects to bottom-up, GP ‘controlled’ projects, with equal 
partnerships lying somewhere in the middle (ibid). At the end of the first ‘live’ purchasing year the TP-
NET categorised the first wave pilots into five distinct types. This typology was based on the stage of 
development, project objectives, achievements and future ambitions and is as follows: under-performing 
TPPs - projects not intending to achieve service change; developmental TPPs - projects in a preparatory 
phase who had not yet achieved change in TP-related areas but intended to do so; co-purchasing TPPs - 
projects influencing service provision through partnership with the HA; primary care developer TPPs - 
projects focussing on developing primary care in TP-related areas, either through holding a budget and 
contracting independently or through co-purchasing; commissioning TPPs - projects that hold budgets, 
contracts independently and purchases directly in TP-related areas to achieve change in both primary 
and secondary care (Mays, Goodwin et al. 1998). This typology reiterates that in some pilots GPs 
enjoyed a higher degree of freedom and level of influence than in others.   
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2.3.8 Leese and Mahon (1999) identified three broad categories of relationships between HAs and TPPs. 
Good relationships, where the HA played a supportive role and allowed sufficient autonomy; initial 
conflict but improving relationships, where the need for collaboration was acknowledged but conflict 
could arise when the TPP wanted more autonomy (in line with fundholding) but as the budget holder, the 
HA felt responsible for their activities; the third relationship was one characterised by lack of trust of the 
HA and scepticism regarding their belief in the scheme (Leese and Mahon 1999) (Leese and Mahon 
1999). 
2.3.9 Interview data from TPP lead GPs and managers revealed that in the early stages of the scheme, the 
process was very much TPP-led, with lead GPs being the key players. Involvement of other GPs was 
varied. There was also significant HA involvement although this did not appear to affect development 
decisions (Dixon, Goodwin et al. 1998). In 1995, only 36% of health authorities (92% response rate) 
reported affording their TPP ‘total’ autonomy in decision-making. Most (55%) aimed to give as much 
freedom as possible, but with qualifications. This usually required ensuring alignment with HA strategy. A 
small number (9%) allowed the TPP little or no autonomy in decision-making (ibid).  
2.3.10 In practice it appeared that the TP projects badged as ‘commissioning TPPs’ had more autonomy and 
hence influence over decision-making compared to the other projects, and hence had more meaningful 
clinical input in the commissioning process (albeit if the clinical input came predominantly from lead 
GPs). Even by their second year, however, most likely due to the nature of the scheme, all pilots still had 
a degree of dependence on the HA (Malbon, Goodwin et al. 1999). Despite this, ‘commissioning’ pilots 
were the highest achievers in terms of their own objectives and objectives relating to TPP service areas 
(Goodwin, Mays et al. 1998).    
2.3.11 The introduction of PCGs marked the beginning of a shift in the role of GPs in commissioning 
organisation. Early findings of the national evaluation of PCG/Ts conducted by the Birmingham HSMC, 
suggested that decision-making within the PCG was centred within the chief executive/PEC chair (who 
was always a GP) pairing. The HA was also flagged as a key site for decision making. Further, the chair 
was felt to be the most influential member (Smith, Regen et al. 2000). This was also confirmed by 
(Regen, Smith et al. 1999; Wilkin, Gillam et al. 2000; Wilkin, Gillam et al. 2001). Therefore while it 
appeared that clinical leadership was evident it was limited predominantly to one single GP who did hold 
considerable power within the PCG. 
2.3.12 The same study found that PCG boards were typically not working effectively. A specific tension between 
GP board members and other board members was noted. Many non-GP board members felt that the 
PCG agenda and board meetings were ‘inappropriately dominated’ by GPs (Smith, Regen et al. 2000). In 
some areas, the number of GPs on the board was deliberately kept to less than half in order to facilitate 
more inclusive working. GPs contribution to the PCG and their motives were also questioned by others 
(ibid). On the whole, the attitudes towards GPs within PCGs appeared to be negative with very much an 
‘us’ and ‘them’ feel. In a study of clinical input into HA health improvement programmes the Audit 
Commission (2000) found that most shadow PCGs and clinicians had little involvement in this and in 
some cases only the shadow PCG chair was consulted.  
2.3.13 Clinical engagement in commissioning in PCTs, prior to the introduction of PbC, appears to represent a 
historical low point, in terms of clinical engagement. An interview study, conducted in 2004, provides a 
detailed and informative description of how commissioning was undertaken by PCTs (Bate, Donaldson et 
al. 2007). The study found that the role of clinicians was marginal and they were used primarily as a 
‘sounding board’ and at best, a source of factual information. In terms of the commissioning process, if 
anything, clinicians represented a ‘problem’ in that their behaviours and decisions acted to frustrate 
‘rational’ commissioning. The study concluded that in the process of moving from PCGs to PCTs, GPs 
were effectively and deliberately side-lined (Bate, Donaldson et al. 2007). Results from a qualitative 
subsection of the national evaluation of PCG/Ts echo these findings (Locock, Regen et al. 2004). GPs 
reportedly felt that with the movement from PCG to PCT, the agenda became more managerially driven 
(with a general increase in the number of managers), making it more difficult for GPs to exert control over 
decision-making (ibid).  
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2.3.14 As with TP there was no central specification of PbC structures, and as a result there was considerable 
diversity, with past experiences having some impact on the structures set up (Coleman, Checkland et al. 
2010). Most PbC consortia had some sort of ‘Executive’ group which undertook the work associated with 
the scheme and had delegated decision making powers. These groups were usually dominated by GPs, 
with some also having practice managers, nurses and occasionally lay members. In some areas the GPs 
were voted into position, whilst in others there were insufficient volunteers to require a vote to be held 
(Curry, Goodwin et al. 2008; Coleman, Checkland et al. 2009). Most consortia had some kind of 
managerial support provided by the PCT, and the extent to which GPs truly led the agenda depended to 
a large extent on the dynamics of the relationship between the assigned managers and the GPs. At best, 
the assigned managers were facilitative and supportive, acting as enablers to promote clinical leadership; 
however, in some areas the PCT maintained a strict control over what could be done by consortia and 
limited the extent to which clinical leaders could make decisions and act upon them. More widely, the 
extent to which GPs were able to act as leaders was heavily dependent upon the dynamics of the overall 
PCT-PbC relationship. Thus, for example, PbC groups had limited autonomy to make major decisions 
about services, and in many areas even small investment decisions had to be ‘signed off’ by PCT 
committees. Whilst in some areas this process was relatively simple and unproblematic, in others it could 
be tortuous and complicated, with significant delays whilst decisions were passed between PCT 
committees. Some PCTs took the approach of allowing PbC consortia autonomy over small amounts of 
expenditure, whilst requiring ‘sign off’ for more substantial investment (or disinvestment) decisions. A 
small number of PCTs took a much more radical approach, devolving significant proportions of the 
overall PCT budget to PbC consortia. In these areas, GPs felt that they were truly leading and setting the 
agenda. The role of managers has been shown to be crucial in engaging clinicians. A new type of 
manager was identified in the national evaluation of PbC. They were termed ‘animateurs’ and worked 
creatively to ensure that PbC groups behaved in certain ways. These players were seen to positively 
facilitate clinical commissioning (Checkland et al 2011). Studies of PbC in general found that there was 
very little involvement from other clinicians such as nurses (Coleman, Harrison et al. 2007; Curry, 
Goodwin et al. 2008; Coleman, Checkland et al. 2009).  
2.4 Budgetary control / contracts  
2.4.1 The degree of budgetary control varied considerably in the different forms of primary care-led 
commissioning. Only FHs had complete autonomy over the budget which was devolved to the 
fundholding practice or consortium. In all alternative and later schemes budgets were only nominal with 
health authorities remaining responsible for expenditure.  
2.4.2 FHs had complete autonomy over a specified (and somewhat constrained) budget which was devolved 
to them by their HA. This increased financial and managerial control and accountability reportedly caused 
GPs to become more aware of the costs associated with their behaviour (Howie, Heaney et al. 1993; 
Coleshill, Goldie et al. 1998). Responsibility for negotiating contracts also rested with the FHs. Despite 
the extra work these responsibilities brought, GPs reportedly relished the job due to the associated 
increase in power  (Glennerster 1994).  
2.4.3 In schemes established as alternatives to fundholding only some practices received a small nominal 
budget. On the whole, however, budgetary control and negotiation of contracts rested mainly with the HA 
(Glennerster, Cohen et al. 1998; Hudson Hart, Drummond et al. 1999). 
2.4.4 While TPPs evolved from fundholding and practices within the TPP were fundholding practices, the 
absence of legislation to give TPPs organisational autonomy meant that budgets were indicative. Whilst 
TPPs held a budget, budgetary responsibility ultimately remained with the local HA (Mays 1996). The 
national evaluation found that GPs were more willing to accept financial responsibility for their clinical 
decisions where they were actively engaged in the management of a budget (Place, Posnett et al. 1998). 
This responsibility was often devolved to a small minority. Holding a budget also signified that a pilot had 
the potential to contract. This was thought to be as important as actually contracting (Malbon, Goodwin et 
al. 1999). In the first ‘live’ year of purchasing, 62% of pilots contracted independently for at least some 
15 
 
services (Robinson, Raftery et al. 1998) and, surprisingly, this figure barely rose in the second ‘live year 
(Robison, McLeod et al. 1998)).  
2.4.5 PCGs were essentially a sub-committee of their constituent HA and as such budgetary responsibility 
ultimately rested with the HA. In a survey of PCGs in 2000 the Audit Commission found that of those 
PCGs that had held meetings with their main provider trusts to review services only 1/5 involved 
clinicians from primary and secondary care. A further 1/5 involved no clinicians from either side in these 
meetings (Audit commission 2000). As PCGs progressed to PCTs, they became statutory bodies in their 
own right and took on the management of the entire NHS purchasing budget. (Peckham and Exworthy 
2003). By 2002 (Wilkin, Coleman et al. 2002) showed an increased devolution of budgetary responsibility 
from HAs to PCG/Ts and in turn PCG/Ts being encouraged to devolve notional budgets to their 
practices. 
2.4.6 PbC budgets were indicative, and as such, the PCT, as statutory body, retained overall responsibility. 
PCTs varied in the extent to which they devolved responsibility for budgets to PbC consortia (Checkland, 
Coleman et al. 2011). A small number of PCTs devolved the entire PCT commissioning budget, but in 
general devolution was much more limited than this. A survey carried out in 2007 suggested that a 
quarter (24%) of PbC groups in the sample had a devolved budget covering the nationally suggested 
minimum of: secondary care services covered by payment by results; prescribing; community services; 
and mental health services. A further 26% of groups had a devolved budget covering secondary care 
services and prescribing, whilst 18% had a budget covering secondary care services only and 9% 
described a devolved budget covering a wider range of services than the suggested minimum (Coleman, 
Harrison et al. 2007).   
2.4.7 In practice, however, such devolutions were often nominal, with PbC consortia having little actual control 
over the spending of the budget. On the other hand, although consortia were generally unable to make 
any significant spending decisions without PCT authorisation, detailed observation of meetings in one 
study revealed that many PbC consortia took their budgetary responsibilities seriously. For example, it 
was common in meetings for figures to be presented that itemised the spending across all elements of 
the budget by GP practice, with the presentation of ‘league tables’ and ‘naming and shaming’ of 
overspending practices. This type of scrutiny depended upon the provision of accurate expenditure 
figures, which could be a problem at times. Whilst prescribing costs were easily obtained and broken 
down to practice-level, scrutiny of hospital expenditure was hampered by the tardy provision of activity 
data by hospitals. PbC groups were also seen to expend some energy in ensuring that hospital Payment 
by Results (PbR) claims were accurate, with some PbC consortia claiming some success in challenging 
hospitals over their bills (Coleman, Checkland et al. 2009). At the end of each year, savings were 
calculated and PbC consortia were entitled to reinvest 70% of these in new services. However, these 
calculations were neither straightforward nor uncontested (Audit Commission 2007; Checkland, Coleman 
et al. 2011). 
2.4.8 Under PbC, contracting responsibilities remained with the PCT but in some areas the PCT involved PbC 
clinicians in contract discussions. There was some evidence that GPs involved in this way were more 
likely to be confrontational in their dealings with Hospital Trusts than PCT managers (Coleman, 
Checkland et al. 2009).  
2.5 Links with GP practices 
2.5.1 Apart from single practice fundholding schemes all commissioning models involved networks of 
practices. The relationship between the lead GPs and other GPs and practices is an important one as it 
provides the basis for the legitimacy of GP-led commissioning. However, in their study of fundholding 
practices, Surender and Fitzpatrick (1999) found that in practices where lead GPs assumed the bulk of 
responsibility this was satisfactory for most non-leads; although some struggled with the dilemma of not 
wanting to take on extra responsibility yet wishing to be more involved in project decisions. It appears 
that a single enthusiastic GP (along with management administrative support) was sufficient to lead the 
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scheme and assume responsibility for the majority of the work. It was, however, also important that rank 
and file GPs needed to believe that the ‘activist’ was legitimate (Surender and Fitzpatrick 1999).  
2.5.2 The involvement of GP practices within HA advisory bodies varied. Whilst ‘locality-based’ models 
potentially gave all GPs a say, ‘group based’ advice was criticised because the fora did not necessarily 
represent the local GP community at large. The ‘centrally based’ approach, where the advice obtained 
rested upon a few chosen doctors, did not necessarily reflect local GP opinion and was perceived to be 
the least accountable (BMA 1997). We found  were no studies that reported on mechanisms used to 
communicate with GPs not involved in the advisory group.  
2.5.3 The TP-NET team closely examined GP linkages in 11 case study pilots. A central theme relating to why 
some pilots were able to achieve more change than others was found to be the result of ‘key leaders and 
willing followers’. The most enabling scenario was one where strong dynamic leadership was teamed 
with other key TPP players willing to play a part whilst at the same time being willing to respect 
leadership (Goodwin, Abbott et al. 2000). Higher achievers were more likely to report having an 
enthusiastic lead GP and lower achievers more likely to report lack of enthusiasm amongst GPs (Malbon, 
Goodwin et al. 1999). Where there was heavy reliance on a limited number of key individuals, there was 
an understandable concern regarding the fragility of the pilot.  Successful TPPs learnt, both structurally 
and culturally, to create an environment for inter-practice cooperation and leadership within the pilot 
(Goodwin, Abbott et al. 2000).  
2.5.4 A detailed case study of one of the ‘pioneer’ TP projects (Walsh, Shapiro et al 1999), reported that it was 
very much a collaborative venture between GPs, the HA and hospital trusts. Akin to the TP-NET data, a 
lead GP from each practice sat on the board of the main decision-making body and these were the key 
players. They represented the needs of their ‘non-lead’ colleagues. This arrangement was, in the most 
part, deemed acceptable although there were some negative comments regarding the paucity of input 
from these doctors. Good communication links and ‘faith’ in the lead GP were found to be crucial for the 
wider partnership to lend support to the lead (Walsh, Shapiro et al. 1999).  
2.5.5 Single practice TPPs reportedly went further to engage rank and file GPs and ensure they were aware of 
the financial consequences of their clinical decisions. In these pilots, all GPs rather than just the lead 
were more likely to receive monitoring information, be involved in decisions concerning expenditure, and 
agreeing protocols for making changes to referral policies if required due to budget constraints. These 
communication mechanisms appeared to increase GP buy-in to the project and as a result enabled 
budgets to be managed more effectively  (Bevan, Bachmann et al. 1998).  
2.5.6 The TPP evaluation team also examined transaction costs and found that in some sites GPs were happy 
to delegate most of the routine responsibility to the TPP management team and the lead GP. As projects 
became more established, this trend became more apparent (Place, Posnett et al. 1998). Whilst this lack 
of active GP engagement reduced the transaction costs of the pilots, it also reduced the extent to which 
GPs were influenced by their referral behaviour. In short, the extent to which GPs accepted the financial 
responsibility for their clinical decisions depended on how actively engaged they were in the 
management of the budget. Ensuring the engagement of rank and file GPs came, however, at a high 
monetary expense (ibid). Place et al’s study of seven TPPs found that more than 50% of the incremental 
cost associated with TPPs (compared to purchasing as FHs) was committed to managing internal 
relations ie coordinating the views of independent GPs and involving them in the commissioning process.  
2.5.7 In an evaluation of PCG/PCTs Regen (2002) examined the level and nature of GP involvement. In two 
surveys sent to grassroots GPs in 1999 and 2000, GPs reported that the main way they were involved 
with the PCG was through a GP representative (usually a board member) who was responsible for both 
representing the wider voice of GPs and informing constituents of developments at PCG level (Regen 
2002). These surveys also collected data on grassroots participation in PCG/T activities. The vast 
majority ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ attended board meetings and almost two thirds ‘rarely’ or had never attended a 
subgroup meeting. Locality meetings were far better attended with more than half ‘always’ or ‘sometimes’ 
attending. Further, in nine of the twelve case study PCG/Ts over half the GPs reported that they ‘always’ 
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or ‘sometimes’ commented on discussion documents. This was felt to be critical in terms of ‘lending 
credibility to PCG/T policy’ (ibid).  
2.5.8 Overall, Regen (2002) found low levels of direct and active participation by GPs in these organisations. 
GPs cited heavy workloads and time constraints as barriers to more involvement. Some respondents 
objected to the wider policy context. They disagreed with the idea of clinicians taking on managerial 
responsibilities and believed GPs should focus on clinical duties rather than rationing.  Finally, GPs 
reported that they were marginalised in key decision-making processes (Regen 2002). In another study 
of GP perceptions of PCGs, the authors found GPs were generally unaware of published priorities, 
indicating a low level of engagement in the commissioning process (Dowswell, Harrison et al. 2002).  
2.5.9 The Audit Commission (2000) surveyed PCG chief executives and found that the majority of them 
perceived practices to be supportive. However, some respondents did express concern regarding ‘GP 
suspicion, lack of involvement or vision and the scale of cultural change required.’ Tensions were 
reportedly present between ‘reformers’ and GPs unconvinced of the need for change. PCGs that had 
area sub-groups were more likely to cite GPs as being supportive. Other mechanisms listed to improve 
involvement included improving communication through information, news sheets and meetings; 
securing ownership; and practice-based planning or devolved decision-making (Audit commission 2000). 
Bravo-Vergel and Ferguson (2006) found that without GP buy-in, enforcing rationing policies was difficult. 
GPs were found to respond better when other GPs acted as educators and disseminators. They were 
seen to have more legitimacy than the PCT (Bravo Vergel and Ferguson, 2006).  
2.5.10 The National Tracker Survey of PCG/Ts undertaken by the NPCRDC revealed that the majority of 
organisations had not won the support of their GPs (Wilkin and Coleman 2001). Two fifths (43%) of 
PCGs who were later evolving into PCTs (aiming to gain PCT status in 2002 or later) cited GP resistance 
or disinterest as an obstacle to becoming a successful PCT although a third of those moving early to 
Trust status (in 2001 or earlier) did so without active, local GP support. ‘Early’ trusts alluded to those 
gaining PCT status in 2001 or prior and ‘late’ trusts were aiming for 2002. This evidence suggested that 
GPs were not committed to the Trust agenda.  
2.5.11 PbC was introduced as an approach directly led by GPs. While a Kings Fund/Nuffield Trust study 
suggested that the engagement of GP practices under PbC was limited (Curry, Goodwin et al. 2008) the 
findings of the evaluation undertaken by the NPCRDC (Coleman, Checkland et al 2009) provided a more 
nuanced picture, suggesting that, whilst it was true that only a minority of GPs were actively involved with 
PbC, this was not necessarily a bad thing. Their report concluded that what was required (and was 
present in many places) was a committed group of activists prepared to do the work of PbC, who were 
perceived by their constituent GPs as having legitimacy to act on their behalf. In addition, there needed 
to be a willingness amongst GP practices to undertake work specified by this executive group. Such 
legitimacy was helped by: formal sign up arrangements, with clear written inter-practice agreements; a 
sense amongst ‘rank and file’ GPs that they were being kept fully informed about PbC and its processes; 
systems that ensured that GPs were aware of and able to use any new services or pathways had been 
developed; a financial incentive scheme perceived to reward work appropriately; and perceptions that 
progress was being made. Factors that undermined the perceived legitimacy included: concern that 
national policy might substantially alter or abolish PbC at any time; and perceived excessively tight 
control by PCTs, with overly bureaucratic processes or a failure to support innovation (Coleman, 
Checkland et al. 2009). In addition, it was felt to be helpful if PbC consortia had been able to form 
themselves into groups that they had chosen themselves, rather than having been allocated by the PCT 
(Checkland, Coleman et al. 2008).  
2.5.12 PbC consortia had put in place a variety of processes with which to communicate with their constituent 
practices. These included: plenary meetings to disseminate information, explain budgetary figures and 
answer queries; newsletters and round-robin emails containing information about progress and budgets; 
and visits to practices to discuss their individual issues and problems. In addition, some larger PbC 
consortia had local sub-groups (often called localities) at which representatives from all practices in a 
geographical area met together to discuss progress under PbC (Coleman, Checkland et al. 2009). One 
unexpected finding in this study of PbC was the appetite amongst those involved for the active 
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performance management of constituent practices. In some areas this went beyond performance 
management against devolved budgets, and included attention to such things as performance against 
the General Medical Services (GMS) contract Quality and Outcomes Framework. Methods of 
performance management adopted included the public dissemination and discussion of performance 
figures, and visits to practices to discuss individual performance (Coleman, Checkland et al. 2009). 
2.6 Perceived influence of the commissioning organisation outside itself  (by both the GPs and other 
agencies) 
2.6.1 The issue of how much influence GPs or the commissioning organisations had is of particular relevance 
to determining the impact of primary care-led models of commissioning and the role of clinician 
engagement in them. It is important to recognise that GPs, managers and other organisations would 
have different perceptions about the degree of influence and its impact. Thus, this section is divided into 
two broad subsections. The first examines the perception of how clinicians viewed their own influence 
and the second on how other relevant agencies viewed their level of influence. 
GPs’ perceptions 
2.6.2 Fundholding staff reported achieving the most immediate impact of their actions - for example seeing 
waiting times fall or setting up a new clinic (Bain 1992; Consumers Association 1995). Fundholding GPs 
thus perceived that they had increased control and influence over hospital services. In a small qualitative 
study, GPs claimed that they were able to improve service quality due to their ability to negotiate with 
hospitals (Lapsley, Llewellyn et al. 1997). This sense of having more power in the health economy than 
they had previously experienced, led to GPs feeling enthused and empowered (Ellwood 1997; Cowton 
and Drake 1999). This positive feedback loop appears to have been a driving factor motivating GPs to 
either remain or become involved in the scheme. This perception of influence worked both at the single 
practice-level but was enhanced when GPFHs worked together. Locock reported that GPFHs were able 
to exert more influence over providers when they worked together (Locock 1994). The perception of 
influence appears to be particularly relevant to whether GPs engage in commissioning processes. 
Surender and Fitzpatrick reported that GP leads claimed more benefits than non-leads (Surender and 
Fitzpatrick 1999). 
2.6.3 A survey investigating the participation of GPs in a specific HA-GP commissioning collaboration (City and 
Hackney’s GP forum) found that one quarter of responding GPs doubted the extent of their influence on 
the health service locally. The reasons GPs doubted their influence was based on their view that there 
had been a lack of visible results, a lack of power due to the forums advisory nature, and a disregard of 
the GP representation by government, HA and providers (Graffy and Williams 1994). Similarly many of 
the GPs in non-fundholding schemes in Glennerster et al’s study, who had hoped to achieve change, 
were disappointed and reportedly became disillusioned by their lack of influence (Glennerster (a), Cohen 
et al. 1998). It seems acting directly (as a FH) was more satisfactory than having an agent at one remove 
responsible for purchasing on one’s behalf (ibid). 
2.6.4 Perceptions of success and influence were important in influencing the activities of TPPs. There is 
evidence that in the second year of ‘live’ purchasing, fewer TPPs prioritised the more ‘complex’ areas. 
For example, 50% fewer TPPs tackled emergency admissions in 1997/8 compared with 1996/7 (Malbon, 
Goodwin et al. 1999). The likely reason is that this proved to be a particularly difficult area to influence. 
Only a minority of TPPs successfully achieved the majority of objectives in influencing secondary care. 
TPPs reported this was due to their inability to negotiate new contracts with current providers (who 
sought to maintain their income) or switch to alternatives (Malbon, Goodwin et al. 1999; McLeod and 
Raftery 2000). In a telephone interview survey of first wave pilots, 82% of TPPs contracting 
independently reported problems in obtaining agreement on some or all of their contracts (Robinson, 
Raftery et al. 1998). Where successful, collaborative relationships, rather than exerting influence through 
contracting was frequently reported as an important enabling factor for achieving change to hospital 
services (Robison 1998; Wyke, Hewison et al. 1998). While influencing secondary care proved difficult 
TPPs found they were better able to influence change in primary and community services compared with 
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secondary care and thus focussed their attentions on developing these areas (ibid). Arguably, these 
areas could largely be controlled within the TPP, rather than having to influence outside organisations. 
2.6.5 GPs perceived PCGs to have even less influence or impact and Wilkin et al (Wilkin, Coleman et al. 
2002[~]463)[~] found that two fufths of commissioning leads believed they had very little leverage over 
NHS providers of hospital services. Interview data from 49 GP principals in two health districts in the 
North of England  revealed that over a third of GPs felt the PCG had no impact and few were inspired by 
this arrangement (Dowswell, Harrison et al. 2002). Of a group of 16 GPs interviewed as part of the study 
by the HSMC, seven felt there was potential for, or actual improvement in quality of care locally. Seven 
felt PCG/T policies had resulted in little change to quality and a further two felt quality of care had 
declined (Locock, Regen et al. 2004). Postal survey and interview data revealed that many GPs 
perceived their PCG/T to be ‘ineffective or impotent’. GPs were particularly disappointed with the lack of 
tangible change (Regen 2002). In a Scottish study examining the establishment of local GP co-
operatives after the end of fundholding, ex GPFHs reported that they felt disillusioned that efforts from 
FHs seemed to have been in vain (Coleshill). 
2.6.6 Published reports evaluating PbC suggest scepticism amongst GPs about the influence of PbC, with 
beliefs that the policy might be abandoned at any time being a significant factor in reducing enthusiasm 
(Curry, Goodwin et al. 2008; Wood and Curry 2009). This suggests that there has been a cumulative 
impact of the adoption and abandonment of clinical commissioning schemes since the 1990s on GP 
enthusiasm. Coleman et al (Coleman, Checkland et al. 2009) by contrast found many activist GPs 
claiming significant successes as a result of their involvement in PbC. Examples included: redesign of 
services or service pathways; development and provision of new services, both in GP practices and 
across the area as a whole; and the improvement of service quality in general practices, including, for 
example, the purchase of new equipment such as ECG machines. In general, in common with previous 
GP commissioning schemes, PbC consortia found it easier to develop and change services in primary 
care than they did to change services provided by hospitals, with little evidence of successful 
disinvestment in services (Curry, Goodwin et al. 2008; Coleman, Checkland et al. 2009).  
By other agencies 
2.6.7 Although initially dismissive of FHs, in time, hospital trusts came to realise that their survival depended 
on getting FHs’ money (Glennerster 1994). While fundholding only represented 14% of hospital and 
community services funding, providers did view GPFHs as being powerful. In one study, NHS trust staff 
described FHs as having a disproportionate level of influence in relation to their relative market share 
(Drummond 2001). However, their potential to affect wide-scale change in the health system was always 
bounded as District Health Authorities remained the major purchaser. Even in non-fundholding models 
GPs were viewed as influential. For example, 92% of NHS managers asked about the City and Hackney 
GP forum felt it was influencing the health service. The study’s authors do, however, advise treating this 
data with caution, because they believe these stakeholders would be reluctant to admit they were not 
open to GP influence (Graffy and Williams 1994). This point is demonstrated in the findings of the study 
by Hudson et al (1999). They interviewed 31 GPs and 41 HA managers within 28 HAs. While all GPs 
interviewed identified positive benefits from their involvement in the commissioning process, in stark 
contrast, 63% of HA respondents identified no beneficial outcomes. This suggests that, in these areas, 
GPs influence was less than they perceived themselves (Hudson Hart, Drummond et al. 1999). 
2.6.8 Being ‘new players’ in the health economy, TPPs initially struggled to be taken seriously by health 
authorities and hospitals (Robinson, Raftery et al. 1998). Wyke and colleagues (2003) report on three 
main features which caused NHS trusts to not take TPPs as seriously as they might have. Firstly, ‘pilot 
status’ was viewed as ‘an expression of uncertainty rather than a desire to learn through experimenting’. 
This enabled hospital trusts to resist contractual changes that would ultimately lead to a shift of resources 
from secondary to primary care. Secondly, TPPs did not receive the supportive backing they required 
from Conservative Ministers. When low quality, high cost hospitals were destabilised due to reallocation 
of resources by purchasers, ministerial support tended to favour hospital trusts in order to preserve 
popularity with the public. This, in turn, weakened TPPs’ legitimacy and influence. Thirdly, within the TPP 
lifespan, it became clear that Labour, who had promised to end fundholding and other practice-based 
purchasing schemes, were likely to win the 1997 general election. This speculation, and reality when 
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Labour were eventually elected (and signalled the new direction of mandatory PCGs), made it even 
harder for TPPs to engage the attention of providers (Wyke, Mays et al. 2003). 
2.6.9 We found no evidence about how other agencies perceived PCGs and PCTs or the role of clinicians 
within them on commissioning activities. There is also little evidence in published research reports about 
the way in which PbC was perceived by other organisations. However, a report by the House of 
Commons Health Select Committee (Health Select Committee 2010) obtained anecdotal evidence from a 
range of commentators, with a consensus emerging that PbC had not had a significant influence overall. 
This led to calls for it to be abandoned, or at least significantly altered in its operation (Curry, Goodwin et 
al. 2008; Wood and Curry 2009), with Simmons and English (Simmons, English et al. 2011) arguing that 
clinical networks would be more likely than PbC consortia to have the expertise required to significantly 
improve specialist services such as those for diabetes. 
2.7 Summary of findings on clinical engagement 
2.7.1 The evidence presented in this section identifies a number of key themes about the kinds of roles 
clinicians played in primary care-led commissioning, what the nature of clinical engagement in the 
commissioning process was and how much control and influence did clinicians have over commissioning 
decisions. The evidence examined for this review suggests that some GPs and, where evidence is 
available, other clinicians, have been  keen to engage with commissioning issues. The evidence shows 
that there have been different degrees of clinical engagement both between schemes and also within 
schemes. One common theme that emerges from all the schemes is that a key determinant of clinical 
engagement is the extent to which GPs, in particular, feel that they have some autonomy and control to 
respond to what they perceive are key issues that affect their patient’s experience of health care.  
2.7.2 Those GPs who engaged in commissioning decision-making were generally driven by a desire to 
improve services for their patients because they believed that they were in the best position to make 
such decisions. GPs considered themselves better informed about patient needs as they had practice-
level data and direct feedback from patients on health care services. They felt HAs and PCTs, for 
example, were less well informed. 
2.7.3 However, it is clear that in whatever scheme that was followed not all GPs were active supporters of 
those GPs who engaged with the scheme. Maintaining wider clinical engagement was felt to be a priority 
by those leading schemes but the extent to which this was achieved varied considerably. Engagement 
was easier in smaller schemes but these tended to be limited in scope (eg GP fundfolding) while more 
comprehensive schemes found it more difficult to engage with a wider GP community. For 
commissioning schemes where only a minority of clinicians were involved or where decision-making was 
shared with another body (eg locality schemes, PCGs and PCTs) GPs felt less engaged and tended to 
feel without influence and eventually disengaged from schemes. 
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3. Impact of different clinical commissioning models 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 In this section we examine the evidence on what impact clinician involvement had on outcomes. Early 
studies of fundholding and TPP focused on identifying impacts of the schemes. These can be examined 
in terms of the actual impacts and the motivations and mechanisms used to achieve these.  We have 
categorised the different types of impact and these are grouped as follows: 
 The ability to effect patterns of care including: changes in referrals to secondary 
care, impact on emergency admissions, service development (eg outreach clinics or 
changes in hospital and community services), contracting and priority setting. 
 Changing primary care practice including prescribing and performance management. 
 Quality and experience including improvements in waiting times, patient satisfaction, 
quality of care, the use of evidence (EBM) and improved information. 
 Financial issues such as costs versus savings and the awareness of costs. 
 Improved relationships. 
3.2 Changing patterns of care 
3.2.1 There is evidence to suggest that the strength of fundholding was the closeness of GPs to their patients. 
This translates into an intimate knowledge of demands and needs. GPs prioritised being an advocate for 
their patients above other concerns and priorities mostly reflected perceived local needs. Strong 
ownership of these issues reportedly helped GPs to plan strategies (Tobin and Packham 1999). In other 
schemes, priorities were also based on GPs views and gut instincts about local services (Dixon, Goodwin 
et al. 1998; Walsh, Shapiro et al. 1999). Purchasing goals were also found to be very much those of GPs 
and did not take the views of other health professionals into account (Malbon, Goodwin et al. 1999). The 
evidence also reports a significant tension between tackling national priorities and addressing local 
issues (Regen, Smith et al. 2001; Wilkin, Coleman et al. 2002).  
Referrals to secondary care  
3.2.2 Most of the evidence on referral rates for GPs holding budgets comes from research on fundholding. This 
evidence is, however, mixed. Early research comparing FHs and non-FHs concluded that there was no 
clear impact of the scheme on referrals with a later follow up study also concluding that  fundholding had 
little impact on referrals (Coulter and Bradlow 1993). However, the following study revealed that whilst 
referral rates increased by 25.3% in non-fundholding practices and only 7.5% for fundholding practices, 
FHs had inflated their referral rates in the preparatory year (Surender, Bradlow et al. 1995). Similarly in 
their analysis of referrals and admissions by waves 3 through 6 in one HA Croxson and colleagues found 
that GPs responded to the direct financial incentives of the scheme by raising their referrals and 
admissions in the year prior to becoming FHs and then subsequently reduced them the following year 
(Croxson, Propper et al. 2001). This phenomenon  of lower increases for FHs was also observed in other 
studies on orthopaedic referrals and referrals to a community old age psychiatry service (Fear and Cattel 
1994). Another study in Scotland found that while there had been a general reduction in hospital activity 
this was accompanied by an increase in the use of direct access services such as physiotherapy (Howie, 
Heaney et al. 1995).  
3.2.3 Perhaps the most comprehensive and robust analysis of the effect of budget holding referrals and 
admissions is a retrospective analysis conducted by Dusheiko et al. (2006). They examined chargeable 
elective admissions and found that ex-FHs’ rates increased by between 3.5 and 5.1% following the 
abolition of the scheme. This effect was even stronger (an increase of 8%) for early wave FHs. The 
authors attribute three-fifths of the difference between chargeable elective admissions for FHs and non-
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FHs (a log percentage difference
3
 of 7.3% in 1997/8) to the incentive effect of fundholding (Dusheiko, 
Gravelle et al. 2006). This reflected the findings of an earlier analysis on cataract surgery which found 
that fundholding status was the only characteristic of practices that was significantly associated with 
referral rates. Earlier FHs had lower admission rates than both later FHs and non-FHs to the extent that a 
patient of a first wave fundholding practice was one third less likely to be admitted (Gravelle, Dusheiko et 
al. 2002). Further research by the same group revealed that FHs referred to a wider range of providers 
than non-FHs but that these differences disappeared after the abolition of the scheme (Dusheiko, 
Goddard et al. 2008). Elective admissions became significantly more concentrated across hospitals 
between 1997/8 and 2002/3. Whilst admissions at the main hospital for HAs in 1997/8 constituted a 
49.4% share, this figure rose to 69.4% for PCTs in 2002/3 (ibid).  
3.2.4 Evidence on changing patterns of referrals to secondary care is less concrete for the other 
commissioning schemes. Results from the TPPs evaluation suggest that a couple of the pilots managed 
to decrease elective admissions by more than comparator groups (Raftery and McLeod 1999). There 
have also been some indications of success in managing demand in TPP and PbC (Mays, Goodwin et al. 
1998; Coleman, Checkland et al. 2009) and reports of limited impact under PbC (Curry, Goodwin et al. 
2008).  
3.2.5 A longitudinal study which examined the response of a cohort of FHs to price signals during the first four 
years of the scheme found that FHs tended to use their power to instigate change in the services 
provided by existing suppliers rather than exploiting the huge savings that could be realised by changing 
referral patterns, (Ellwood 1997). This finding is supported by other studies that also found no evidence 
that FHs shopped around for cheaper prices (Propper and Wilson 1996; Spoor and Munro 2003). 
Research findings suggest that hospital location, service quality and waiting times were powerful 
influences on referral behaviour, often more important than price (Ellwood 1997; Strong and Lloyd 1997). 
FHs were also concerned with maintaining local services (Ellwood 1997; Tobin and Packham 1999) and 
Whynes and Reed (1994) found that confidence in the consultant and the quality of feedback were key 
drivers in referral choice. (Whynes and Reed 1994). 
3.2.6 Several studies provide insights about why FHs changed their referral patterns. Mahon et al 1994 found 
that FHs were less likely to perceive that there was only one hospital available to them while Tobin and 
Packham (1999) found that all FHs in their study identified unmet need and remedied this by increasing 
supply. The mechanisms employed included shifting providers, negotiating with existing providers, 
changing the nature of referrals (eg orthopaedics to physiotherapy), setting up in-house clinics and 
sending those waiting the longest to private clinics (Tobin and Packham 1999). Some FHs focused on 
managing demand through peer review of clinical activity - sharing information and auditing activity 
against guidelines for best practice (Mays, Goodwin et al. 1998; Curry, Goodwin et al. 2008; Coleman, 
Checkland et al. 2009).  
Emergency admissions 
3.2.7 While fundholding studies provide most evidence on referral decisions the majority of evidence 
concerning tackling emergency admissions comes from the evaluation of TPPs. During fundholding, 
emergency admissions remained the responsibility of the HA and as such were outside of the remit of 
FHs. One study investigated whether FHs sought to game the system by increasing the proportion of 
patients admitted as an emergency but found no evidence of this (Toth, Harvey et al. 1997).  
3.2.8 Where TPPs had specific objectives relating to altering patterns of acute hospital use (often this was their 
raison d’être), they experienced some success. Only 16 pilots pursued the objective of reducing acute 
hospital admissions and/or length of stay throughout two years of ‘live’ purchasing (McLeod and Raftery 
2000). An analysis of hospital episode statistics revealed that 11/16 (9 multi- and 7 single practices) of 
these pilots reduced their occupied bed days (OBDs) significantly more than a comparator (all local 
practices) (ibid). In the first live year of purchasing (1996/7) 31 pilots sought to influence emergency 
                                                     
3
 Using a log percentage difference - calculated from the natural logs derived from the raw data - provides a more 
accurate percentage difference than if percentage differences in raw data are used. 
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hospital admissions and these were most commonly ‘commissioner’ (the most autonomous) pilots 
(Raftery and McLeod 1999). Clearly many pilots abandoned this ambition in the second year suggesting 
that achieving success in this area was particularly difficult. 
3.2.9 A PbC/PCT partnership reports on an anticipatory case management scheme which aimed to reduce 
emergency admissions by 5%. Close linkages that improved relationships between PbC clinical leads, 
PCT commissioners and managers in the local authority (LA) were thought to have led to fruitful work on 
preventative services (Peretz and Bright 2007). 
3.2.10 Common mechanisms employed to reduce emergency admissions included increasing the number of GP 
beds at the local community hospital; using community nursing teams to prevent admissions; improving 
GP out of hours cover; and focussing on the elderly population. Those targeting length of stay commonly 
used community hospitals to receive early discharged patients and appointed a nurse or primary care 
liaison manager to facilitate early discharge (Raftery and McLeod 1999).  
3.2.11 Whilst the minority of pilots that did make emergency activity a sustained priority did have success in 
reducing OBDs, most found it extremely difficult to move resources away from acute hospitals. TPPs 
faced resistance from trusts in contract negotiations and struggled to agree new contract currencies (eg 
based on admissions or bed days) which would allow them to relate changes in activity to funding 
(McLeod and Raftery 2000). This brings in to question the sustainability of such initiatives. In many 
cases, rather than making savings, the resource implications were positive because essentially TPPs 
were paying for two services concurrently.  Most pilots received supplementary funding for their initiatives 
from their constituent HA (commonly ‘winter pressures’ money) (ibid).  
Service development  
3.2.12 Throughout the years, a number of service developments have been set up in the name of clinical 
commissioning. These have ranged from small, practice-based initiatives to larger schemes. FHs 
specifically focussed on increasing the services that they could provide in-house. The objective behind 
this was to improve the quality of the service offered by practices (Glennerster 1994). The type of new 
services set up included consultant ‘outreach’ clinics, paramedical and diagnostic clinics, increased minor 
surgery and facilities for investigations (Consumers Association 1995; Corney and Kerrison 1997; 
Redfern and Bowling 2000; Drummond, Iliffe et al. 2001). Dermatology, ophthalmology, general surgery, 
ENT, orthopaedics and urology were particularly popular specialities for consultant clinics with mental 
health and physiotherapy being the most popular paramedical areas (Bain 1992; Corney and Kerrison 
1997). A small postal survey of 17 FHs practices in the South Thames area found that almost half of the 
medical specialist and paramedical clinic hours were provided by private practitioners (Kerrison and 
Corney 1998). 
3.2.13 A marked increase in the number of mental health professionals attached to practices was observed in 
FH practices (Corney 1996) and the number of practice nurses employed by practices also increased, as 
did the scope of their activities. Community nursing, however, was not thought to benefit from the 
scheme and there was some concern that GPs do not fully understand the nursing role (Tinsley and Luck 
1998). 
3.2.14 The type of criticisms regarding current service provision was found to be strikingly similar between FHs 
and alternative schemes. The type of changes to service provision instigated in the alternative schemes 
tended, like FHs, to primarily revolve around improving existing primary and community services and also 
speeding up access to secondary care (for example, developing practice-based physiotherapy and 
developing referral criteria for community mental health services) (Hine and Bachmann 1997; 
Glennerster (a), Cohen et al. 1998; Hudson Hart, Drummond et al. 1999).  FHs were, however, found to 
be more critical and as a result planned more change than other types of GP commissioners. GPs not 
involved in any type of commissioning scheme were far less critical than the other two groups 
(Glennerster (a), Cohen et al. 1998).  It is not, therefore, surprising that more service developments were 
observed in FH practices compared to their non-FH counterparts (Corney and Kerrison 1997) and 
although the differences were sometimes small they have been found to be statistically significant 
(Redfern and Bowling 2000). Some GP commissioning groups did, however, claim that they did not have 
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comparable resources at their finger-tips in order to instigate service developments (Glennerster (a), 
Cohen et al. 1998). 
3.2.15 Under FH, whilst service development at the practice (micro) level was quite prolific, activity at the meso 
(HA) level and beyond appeared to have been limited (Drummond, Iliffe et al. 2001). These findings were 
echoed by a study investigating the shift towards primary care in 1998/9 (it included both FH and non-
fundholding models) which concluded shifts in activity from secondary to primary were ‘small, non-
strategic, piecemeal and not underpinned by resource shifts’ (Craig, McGregor et al. 2002). It is difficult 
to judge the success of the service developments in primary care because few were subjected to 
rigorous evaluation. Whilst some practices hailed success simply due to the addition of a new clinic (Bain 
1992); more comprehensive work suggests that the limited benefit of outreach clinics on health status 
does not justify the substantial higher cost (Bowling and Bond 2001). Further, whilst on the surface, the 
attachment of mental health professionals to practices might seem positive; taking these staff away from 
their multidisciplinary teams may fragment services and actually be counterproductive (Corney 1996). In 
the locality-type models it was felt that schemes were unsustainable, mainly due to lack of GP time and 
sufficient resources from the HA (Hine and Bachmann 1997). 
3.2.16 Primary care development appears to have been the area where TPPs achieved most change (Wyke, 
Mays et al. 2003). Having experienced difficulty negotiating changes to secondary care in the first live 
year through contracting, more pilots dropped such objectives and focussed their attentions on 
developing and extending primary and community care, believing progress in these areas would be more 
achievable (Mays, Goodwin et al. 1998; Malbon, Goodwin et al. 1999). Some pilots changed tactics and 
attempted to manage emergency services through intermediate care primary care projects (Wyke, Mays 
et al. 2003). Case study TPPs reported numerous service changes associated with bringing care closer 
to the TPP. This was achieved through both commissioning more local services and modifying existing 
services provided by primary health care teams. Service areas most commonly tackled were mental 
health and maternity services, community and continuing care, and early discharge. Changes initiated in 
these areas included creating a discharge liaison officer introducing nursing home beds and more 
integrated nursing; and commissioning community-based care. (Goodwin, Abbott et al. 2000; Wyke, 
Mays et al. 2003). Enabling mechanisms found to aid service change included financially incentivising 
GPs, encouraging non GP-leads to take an active and leading role in developments, hard-working and 
committed staff, thinking more strategically, pooling funds and general inter-agency cooperation (Lee, 
Donnan et al. 1999; Goodwin, Abbott et al. 2000). 
3.2.17 Areas for development were often chosen based on GP interest or where an obvious local need existed 
(Mays 1996). On the whole, service development was not informed by population needs assessment or 
user engagement (Wyke, Abbott et al. 1999). Many of the changes made were not necessarily new but 
stemmed from existing ideas and were very much shaped by historical context. In the main, the pilots 
acted as a catalyst and provided the impetus for action (Wyke, Myles et al. 1999). 
3.2.18 Evaluation of TPP service developments is near non-existent. Low achievement was reported in areas 
which were new to TP and not under the remit of FHs. TP-NET found achievement in complex areas 
such as mental health as low but in areas under the pilot’s direct control, such as developing the primary 
care team, objectives were more commonly achieved (Goodwin, Mays et al. 1998; Wyke, Mays et al. 
2003). The second live year of purchasing saw a move beyond narrow, local thinking to a more strategic 
approach which involved planning and equity concerns (Goodwin, Abbott et al. 2000). 
3.2.19 In terms of service developments, like TPPs, it appears that PCG/Ts were also more concerned with 
establishing intermediate and community care services than focussing on practice-based initiatives (as 
FHs did). They too, found challenges in dealing with the acute sector and made significantly more 
progress with community care and the primary/secondary care interface (Regen, Smith et al. 2001. 
Health Improvement Programmes (HImPs) were a driver for some of the service development that 
occurred under PCGs. Specific examples include extension of the community mental health team 
(including longer opening hours) in Southampton, outreach family planning and sexual health service for 
young people in Devon, and accident prevention in Blackburn (Regen, Smith et al. 2001). 
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3.2.20 Areas in which GPs engaged were clinical governance and primary care development. Addressing 
variations in quality underpinned much of the primary care development work. Some practice-based 
services set up under FH were abolished in pursuit of equity in what was termed ‘levelling down’ by 
some. In other areas, practice-based services were expanded. Another common initiative within practices 
was new services to aid chronic disease management. At the PCG/T-level, groups developed specialist 
services within primary and community settings to serve as cheaper alternatives to secondary services. 
Examples include a PCG-wide diabetic and a gastro-intestinal service in Harrow and Southampton 
respectively. New community services were commissioned in order to reduce unnecessary hospital 
admissions and included community-based physiotherapy and mental health services. GP value was 
particularly noted in service developments due to their professional insight. It was also reported that GPs 
were more interested in local changes that would affect their everyday practice rather than implementing 
a national agenda (Regen, Smith et al. 2001). A study scrutinising decision-making within a PCG found 
that clinicians perceived simply the action of commissioning a new clinic an achievement in itself.  There 
was little regard for further discussion about  the nature of a service which did not concern them 
(McDonald 2002). Doing something was judged by participants to be more successful than doing nothing 
and in the absence of rigorous evaluations of service development we must be careful in labelling any 
developments as ‘successful’. Interestingly, within PCGs, views of service adequacy and priorities for 
future development significantly differed between GPs and district nurses (Barclay et al 1999).  
3.2.21 A significant number of new services were set up under PbC. These ranged from practice-level 
innovations to initiatives covering whole localities. Outreach services provided by hospital consultants 
were rare. As with some of the other schemes, such as TPPs, these initiatives had often been planned 
previously but it was PbC that provided the impetus for continuation, development and actual 
implementation (Curry, Goodwin et al. 2008; Coleman, Checkland et al. 2009). Larger scale redesign of 
whole care areas and specific clinical pathways was observed during this time and whilst these had PbC 
representation and engagement they were not, bar a few exceptions, led by PbC groups (Coleman, 
Checkland et al. 2009; Wells 2010). In line with previous clinical commissioning schemes, it was reported 
that only a minority of GPs were enthusiastic about broader commissioning with a population-based view 
and most were intent upon more changes in primary care settings (Coleman, Harrison et al. 2007; Curry, 
Goodwin et al. 2008). Coleman and colleagues suggest that rather than a lack of appetite for larger-scale 
change, PbC groups were constrained by their host PCT. There appeared to be a correlation between 
PCT attitudes towards PbC, the level of control they wished to maintain and the scale of innovations 
implemented. Those with tighter control confined groups to small-scale practice-based services 
(Coleman, Checkland et al. 2009). The Audit Commission found that practices were more interested in 
expanding their own provision of services rather than commissioning from others. They reiterated the 
importance of developing comprehensive business cases and appropriate management of conflicts of 
interests (Audit Commission 2007). 
3.3 Contracting 
3.3.1 Only a handful of studies have focussed on the contracting process for clinical commissioning schemes. 
Some of these looked at how FHs managed this aspect of commissioning and it was also an area which 
the TP national evaluation took an interest in. 
3.3.2 Glennerster found that FHs developed more sophisticated contracts over time and that they were keen to 
measure performance against targets (Glennerster 1994). A similar pattern was observed in the TPPs, 
suggesting that there was a significant amount of ‘learning by doing’. In the first live year less than half of 
the pilots studied made significant changes to the HA contract they inherited. The second live year, 
however, saw many more changes with a particular emphasis on quality, clinical guidelines and 
protocols. (Robinson, Raftery et al. 1998; Robison, McLeod et al. 1998). GPs reportedly used more 
quality specifications than health authorities (Glennerster 1994). GPs also used contracts successfully to 
improve the information they received from trusts, for example penalty clauses were written into contracts 
for late discharge information (Robison, McLeod et al. 1998; Drummond, Iliffe et al. 2001). 
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3.3.3 Locock and colleagues undertook a survey of purchasers in Oxford Regional HA. The resulting report 
provides a good insight into how FHs and districts sought to ‘get the best from providers’.  They found 
that districts used GPs in contract meetings (locality-style purchasing models) and found their expertise 
useful especially when hospital clinicians were involved. They also involved GPs in review meetings with 
clinical teams to verify hospital claims. Both districts and FHs used sanctions to ensure quality and 
waiting time targets were met. FHs were found to seek direct contact with clinical hospital staff but were 
careful not to inappropriately bypass management. GP FHs were found to be more comfortable using 
cost-per-case contracts in comparison to districts. They believed that that the threat of losing work 
caused the providers to limit price rises. Further, FHs found that this type of contract encouraged 
providers to ensure that activity data were both accurate and timely. Validating invoices for individual 
patients was also believed to be easier than for block lists of patients. In terms of monitoring, FHs found 
their direct knowledge of patient care useful when discussing quality with trusts. Keeping anecdotal 
reports of poor care was reportedly useful in discussions with hospitals (Locock 1994). 
3.3.4 There appears to be a slight tension between relational and contracting approaches to achieve change. 
Whilst collaborative relationships were widely believed to facilitate service development, views regarding 
the importance of contracting varied (Robison 1998; Wyke, Hewison et al. 1998). Whilst many TPPs 
intended to move to more refined forms of contracts (activity-related /length of stay sensitive) they often 
struggled to implement this change due to resistance from providers who were unwilling to accept such a 
high proportion of financial risk (Robison 1998). In Fishbacher’s study of purchaser provider 
relationships, the majority of FHs did not want to move contracts and only did so as a last resort. Forming 
a partnership relationship was valued by GPs (Fischbacher and francis 1998). 
3.4 Changing primary care practice 
Prescribing 
3.4.1 A key area of attention for primary care-led commissioning schemes has been on GP prescribing costs. 
The fundholding scheme demonstrated that attaching monetary incentives to prescribing tended to 
reduce the rate of growth of prescribing costs (Burr, Walker et al. 1992; Bradlow and Coulter 1993; 
Maxwell, Heaney et al. 1993; Wilson, Buchan et al. 1995; Wilson and Walley 1995; Audit Commission 
1996; Harris and Scrivener 1996; Baines, Brigham et al. 1997; Corney and Kerrison 1997; Rafferty, 
Wilson-Davis et al. 1997; Whynes, Baines et al. 1997; Wilson, Hatcher et al. 1997; Wilson, Hatcher et al. 
1999). This held true for the first three years, after which rates of growth tended to parallel non-
incentivised growth rates, with costs remaining at a lower overall level (Wilson and Walley 1995; Harris 
and Scrivener 1996; Whynes, Baines et al. 1997; Wilson, Hatcher et al. 1997). Only one study, involving 
13 practices in the Oxford region, found little effect of fundholding on prescribing costs (Stewart-Brown, 
Surender et al. 1995). There was no evidence that FHs artificially inflated their prescribing costs in the 
year prior to entering the scheme (Healey and Reid 1994). This trend of containing prescribing costs was 
also seen in the GP commissioning pilots, PCGs and PbC Groups (McLeod, Baines et al. 2000; Smith, 
Regen et al. 2000; McLeod 2001; Ashworth, Armstrong et al. 2002; McLeod 2002; Walker and Mathers 
2002; Coleman, Checkland et al. 2009). 
3.4.2 The mechanisms employed to control prescribing costs by these schemes were varied and included: 
 increasing generic prescribing or choosing the cheaper medicines within a therapeutic class thus 
lowering the cost per item (Bradlow and Coulter 1993; Glennerster 1994; National Audit Office 1994; 
Audit Commission 1996; Rafferty, Wilson-Davis et al. 1997; Wilson, Hatcher et al. 1999; Ashworth, 
Armstrong et al. 2002; McLeod 2002; Coleman, Checkland et al. 2009);  
 using incentive schemes (McLeod, Baines et al. 2000; Smith, Regen et al. 2000); closely monitoring 
repeat prescribing (Glennerster 1994);  
 developing a prescribing formulary (Audit Commission 1996; Dowell, Snadden et al. 1996; Tobin and 
Packham 1999; McLeod, Baines et al. 2000; McLeod 2002);  
 using prescribing advisors, particularly pharmacists to review prescribing behaviour at practice-level 
(McLeod, Baines et al. 2000; Smith, Regen et al. 2000; McLeod 2001; Ashworth, Armstrong et al. 
2002);  
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 stopping the prescribing of medicines with dubious clinical benefit and those available over the 
counter (Audit Commission 1996; Dowell, Snadden et al. 1996); 
 containing the rise in prescribing volume (Wilson, Hatcher et al. 1999);  
 agreeing guidelines with hospitals regarding discharge arrangements (Audit Commission 1996);  
 acting more cautiously with respect to introducing new and expensive preparations into their 
repertoire (Maxwell, Heaney et al. 1993);  
 peer review and sharing prescribing data amongst practices which resulted in peer pressure to 
change habits (Mays, Goodwin et al. 1998; McLeod, Baines et al. 2000; Smith, Regen et al. 2000; 
McLeod 2002). 
3.5 Attitudes towards performance management 
3.5.1    As mentioned in section 3.3.3 above, peer review was used across the schemes in order to influence the 
behaviour of rank and file GPs within the purchasing organizations. For example, 83% of TPPs had 
protocols for sharing information on activity and financial performance between practices (Bevan, 
Bachmann et al. 1998). Peer review was not limited to changing prescribing habits but was also 
commonly used to control referrals. It was found to be an effective strategy. TPP evidence reveals that 
GPs in pilots with more than 20 practices were significantly less likely to consult before making a costly 
referral (Bevan, Bachmann et al. 1998). It can be inferred that GPs in larger organisations could easily 
blend into the background, unnoticed. The actions of those in smaller pilots were clearly more easily 
identifiable and this appears to be an important determinant of clinical behaviour. 
3.5.2   Attitudes of GPs towards peer review seems to have evolved. Research of a GP commissioning pilot 
shows that despite mixed reactions initially, peer review became normalised and was accepted over time 
(Whynes, Baines et al. 1997). Similar findings were reported from a study of GPs involved in a 
prescribing initiative (Walker and Mathers 2004). By the time PCGs came into being, most GPs expected 
there to be a focus on performance management and there was some support for this approach (Smith, 
Regen et al. 2000; Dowling, Wilkin et al. 2002)). Research on PbC reported that a new willingness by 
GPs to engage in peer review was an unexpected, yet positive, consequence of the scheme. The 
mechanisms employed included visits to practices to discuss performance and publication of named 
performance data (Coleman, Checkland et al. 2009). These findings are echoed by further work in this 
area (Curry, Goodwin et al. 2008).  
3.6 Quality and experience 
Waiting times 
3.6.1 During the FH era some evidence was published which suggested FHs negotiated shorter waits for non-
urgent elective surgery and outpatient appointments (Kammerling and Kinnear 1996; Dowling 1997). A 
more recent, retrospective analysis showed that, in one HA, waits for patients having procedures covered 
by FHs fell by 8% (Propper, Croxson et al. 2002). Further work, which accounted for selection bias, also 
concluded that patients of FH practices had shorter waiting times for both chargeable and non-
chargeable elective admissions (Dusheiko, Gravelle et al. 2004). Conflicting data from Redfern and 
Bowling found no objective evidence of FH patients being seen more quickly. This study did, however, 
only focus on local NHS hospitals so could not pick up referrals to private providers (Redfern and 
Bowling 2000). 
3.6.2   In 1993, the Joint Consultants Committee documented examples for 32 hospitals where preferential 
treatment was available. For example, in Ashford, ‘clinics have been arranged for fundholders’ patients 
only to enable them to be seen more quickly’; in Oxford ‘consultants were asked to give priority to 
fundholders’ patients for elective surgery’; and in Essex ‘the trust board has given an order of priority for 
patients treatment which puts patients of fundholders before long waiters and puts DHA patients’ elective 
surgery at the bottom of the list (Joint Consultants Committee 1993). A subsequent survey conducted by 
the BMA revealed that patients of GPFHs were offered arrangements not available to patients of other 
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purchasers in 40% of responding hospitals. Around the same time, an Association of Community Health 
Councils in England Wales (ACHCEW) survey revealed that a fifth of Community Health Councils 
(CHCs) reported that GPFH patients got priority access to hospital services. Further work by this 
organisation exposed more cases where FH patients were fast-tracked (Association of Community 
Health Councils for England and Wales 1994). 
3.6.3 However, Kammerling and Kinnear in their research on such fast tracking, suggested that GPFHs only 
referred sicker patients who were thus allocated higher priority and seen more quickly (Kammerling and 
Kinnear 1996). It is unlikely that this totally explains the shorter waits phenomenon. Improving the quality 
of the service offered to patients was a core objective for many FHs (Glennerster 1994). One way in 
which they sought to achieve this was by improving waiting times for their patients. Dowling argues that 
FHs had more determination and incentives (keeping their patients happy) to reduce waits. He rejects the 
suggestion that the shorter waits were a result of overfunding, case-mix or better contracting. He 
concluded that the use of alternative (private) providers to secure shorter waits triggered NHS providers 
to offer shorter waits to attract FHs work and hence income (Dowling 2000). This is a plausible 
explanation and other work shows that whilst there was no evidence FHs shopped around for cheaper 
prices, quality and waiting times were drivers for referral behaviour change (Propper and Wilson 1996; 
Ellwood 1997) ie they were willing to refer to a different facility on account of short wait times.  
3.6.4 Long NHS waiting list times were cited by GPs as a reason to use private services (Ellwood 1997; Tobin 
and Packham 1999). Propper et al have argued that it was FHs’ ability to pay for care directly to a 
hospital coupled with their ability to choose providers that incentivised NHS providers to reduce their 
waits  rather than their ability to choose different hospitals (Propper, Croxson et al. 2002). Setting up 
outreach clinics was another mechanism by which to reduce waiting times for patients to see a hospital 
consultant (Bowling and Bond 2001). Securing shorter waits does seem to have been an important factor 
for FHs.  
3.6.5 Little other work was found on waiting times for the other clinical commissioning schemes. One of the 
non-fundholding TPP schemes in Nottingham claimed to have reduced waits at their local provider. Local 
GPs were given waiting times of all providers that Nottingham HA had contracts with and these were 
reportedly utilised by more than three quarters of practices in the scheme. Like FHs, these GPs were 
also concerned about maintaining their local provider and cases were only moved around at the margin 
(Black, Birchall et al. 1994). TPPs also acted to reduce waiting times for their patients. An example is the 
tendering for a local back pain clinic in order to avoid an 18 month waiting list for orthopaedic 
appointments. The pilot funded the service using a combination of development money and resources 
shifted out of the acute trust. This initiative succeeded in reducing wait times for acute back pain 
sufferers (Goodwin, Abbott et al. 2000).  
 
Patient satisfaction 
3.6.6 There is little evidence on how the different commissioning models affected patient satisfaction. Only a 
few studies from the fundholding era report on this and the evidence is conflicting. Surender and 
Fitzpatrick sent a patient satisfaction questionnaire to patients of both FHs and non-FHs. They found 
satisfaction levels high amongst both sets of patients although FH patients were slightly more satisfied 
with access to hospitals and waiting times. They also liked the in-house services offered by the practices 
(Surender, Fitzpatrick et al. 1998). A larger, national study found conflicting results, with FH patients 
being overall less satisfied than their counterparts attending non-fundholding practices. The authors 
tentatively suggest that the financial incentives associated with the scheme may have reduced patient 
satisfaction (Dusheiko, Gravelle et al. 2007). Three studies found no difference in patient satisfaction 
between commissioning and non-commissioning practices (Wyke et al 2001; Corney 1999; Redfern and 
Bowling 2000). 
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3.6.7 Howie and colleagues were very interested in how budget holding would affect the nature of 
consultations with patients. They found that there was no significant change in the way consultations 
were conducted or the experiences of individual patients before and after fundholding (Howie, Heaney et 
al. 1993; Howie, Heaney et al. 1994; Howie, Heaney et al. 1995). 
 
Use of EBM  
3.6.8 Studies of decision-making within commissioning groups have revealed the process to be non-linear and 
at odds with the rational health economic approach (McDonald 2002; Bate, Donaldson et al. 2007; 
Eddama and Coast 2009). The evidence suggests that all forms of primary care-led commissioning 
groups have been shown to use little evidence when making purchasing changes and fared poorly in 
comparison to HAs (Baxter, Stoddart et al. 2001). GPs believed that evidence had only a small role to 
play when commissioning services whereas public health doctors greatly valued quality evidence (ibid). 
In some cases, GPs worked with and were supported by public health staff from the HA; this helped to 
aid the use of evidence about effectiveness of treatments (Walsh, Shapiro et al. 1999). Often changes 
that were implemented were responses to perceived local issues, and as such, local knowledge rather 
than hard evidence was used to react to service demands and inform change (Mahon, Baxter et al. 1998; 
McDonald 2002). GPs were found to be motivated by achieving the objectives that they had set, not by 
considerations of cost-effectiveness (Wyke, Hewison et al. 1998). They have shown little understanding 
of economic evaluation, little interest in public health and are not comfortable with a strategic, population-
wide approach (McDonald 2002). It is therefore not surprising that health needs assessment was not 
widely used (Mahon, Baxter et al. 1998; Walsh, Shapiro et al. 1999). 
3.6.9 Poor and untimely cost and activity data was identified as an inhibiting factor in all the commissioning 
schemes, making it difficult to make changes to services.  Such data is reportedly crucial in order to 
inform priority-setting, budget-setting and contract monitoring functions (Robinson, Raftery et al. 1998; 
Leese and Mahon 1999; Checkland, Coleman et al. 2008)). FHs cited good hospital feedback and 
information as a top priority when considering where to refer; some even used cost-per-case funding as 
an incentive to encourage receipt of quality and timely information (Locock 1994; Whynes and Reed 
1994). 
3.6.10 GP’s experience and local knowledge has been found to be a key source of intelligence in informing 
purchasing decisions (Graffy and Williams 1994; Walsh, Shapiro et al. 1999). Whilst non-GP led 
purchasing organisations, such as HAs, focus on a public health approach, purchasing according to 
needs, GPs are more likely to focus on waiting times (and other outcomes important to patients) and 
anecdotal knowledge about quality (Glennerster (a), Cohen et al. 1998). GP’s intimate knowledge of what 
happens to their patients appears to be one of their key strengths and was likely utilised most in the 
models where GPs had the most decision-making power, ie GPFH. 
3.6.11 Purchasing organisations which relied on a parent body (PCT or HA) often found the information support 
they received from this body was inadequate. This data was often mistrusted and practice data was felt 
to be the most accurate and relevant (Mahon, Baxter et al. 1998; Robinson, Raftery et al. 1998; Smith, 
Regen et al. 2000; Curry, Goodwin et al. 2008). A further problem identified by research on PbC was that 
where data was available, many GPs lacked the confidence and capacity to analyse it properly (Curry, 
Goodwin et al. 2008; Wood and Curry 2009). Checkland and colleagues argue that many of the problems 
associated with PbC were socially constructed and information problems were often a failure to agree on 
the purpose it served, rather than an actual problem of information (Checkland, Coleman et al. 2009). 
Financial considerations 
3.6.12 In relation to district-wide purchasing bodies, the smaller, clinically-led commissioning groups appeared 
to inflate costs. Looking purely at cost, leaving quality of services aside, the evidence reveals that the 
overall costs of the FH scheme outweighed the efficiency savings made (Audit Commission 1996). FHs 
did, however, make substantial savings and at a national level they were around 3.5% of the budget 
underspent. Variation between funds was substantial (Audit Commission 1995). In comparison, the 
locality schemes managed to increase GP involvement in commissioning for a fraction of the cost of 
fundholding but the level of engagement and impact does not rival what was accomplished through FH 
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(Hine and Bachmann 1997; Glennerster, Cohen et al. 1998). Conversely, the transaction costs 
associated with TP were over and above those of fundholding (Place, Posnett et al. 1998). Across the 
schemes there is evidence that sufficient management resources were paramount and further, higher 
management costs were associated with greater success (Mays, Goodwin et al. 1998; Posnett, Goodwin 
et al. 1998; Smith, Shapiro et al. 1998; Coleman, Checkland et al. 2009). 
3.6.13 The TPP evaluation revealed that the relationship between primary care-led purchasing organisation size 
and cost is not clear-cut. Whilst one might expect economies of scale as an organisation grows in size, a 
core component of the additional costs of TPPs fell on internal relationships; essentially engaging GPs 
(Posnett, Goodwin et al. 1998). Coordinating views of rank and file GPs and ensuring meaningful 
engagement in the commissioning process was found to be very costly (Place, Posnett et al. 1998). The 
larger an organisation becomes, the harder it is for GPs to be close to decision-making. On the one 
hand, we have seen that if GPs are to take financial responsibility for their clinical decisions, then it is 
imperative that they are engaged in managing a budget. On the other, securing this engagement does 
not come cheap requiring substantial clinical time and management resources. (Howie, Heaney et al. 
1993; Coleshill, Goldie et al. 1998; Place, Posnett et al. 1998). For example Howie, Heaney et al (1998) 
found that clinicians spent nearly several hours of clinical time on fundholding when they would normally 
see patients and Place et al calculated that transaction costs for GPFH and in TPPs were between £7 
and £8 per head of population. 
Quality  
3.6.14 Whilst GPFHs claimed benefits in terms of ability to improve quality (Lapsley, Llewellyn et al. 1997), there 
is a lack of empirical data linking commissioning to quality of clinical care and morbidity/mortality 
outcomes. Redfern and Bowling argue that GPFHs made no difference to the quality of outpatient care 
(Redfern and Bowling 2000); Howie examined the quality of primary care consultations(see 3.6.7 above); 
finally, Strong and Lloyd state that the things that made GPFHs switch providers were factors amenable 
to management action, for example letter writing and billing, rather than clinical care (Strong and Lloyd 
1997). In summary, the evidence available does not allow us to make any claims about whether clinical 
involvement in commissioning has led to improved quality for patients nor is their evidence to 
demonstrate that GP commissioners prioritised or addressed issues of quality. 
3.7 Relationships  
Relationship with parent body 
3.7.1 TPPs, PbC groups and the alternative schemes to FHs did not exist as separate legal entities; as such, 
they were required to work with a parent body, either a HA or a PCT. This relationship was a key factor 
for the progress of such schemes (Glennerster (a), Cohen et al. 1998; Leese and Mahon 1999; Audit 
Commission 2007; Peretz and Bright 2007; Coleman, Checkland et al. 2009). These commissioning 
groups required support and permission from their parent body to go ahead and facilitate change and 
were essentially operating under constrained conditions. Some groups were frustrated by this and felt 
that the PCT/HA deliberately blocked them from doing anything (Dixon, Goodwin et al. 1998; Glennerster 
(a), Cohen et al. 1998; Coleman, Checkland et al. 2009). In these instances, the parent body either did 
not completely trust the commissioning group (and they were the accountable body) or had little 
enthusiasm for the scheme in general. There were also reports of existing tensions between professional 
and managerial views and parent bodies feeling threatened by the new organisations (Shapiro, Smith et 
al. 1996; Dixon, Goodwin et al. 1998). In the early days of PCGs, HAs were reportedly reluctant to ‘let go’ 
(Smith, Regen et al. 2000). Conversely, where the parent body was enthusiastic (especially senior 
members) and afforded autonomy to the groups to make changes, the latter thrived. For example, the 
TPP evaluation reported that higher achievers were more likely to report their HA providing ‘fair or good’ 
good support compared to lower achievers (Mays, Goodwin et al. 1998). 
3.7.2 ‘Good’ relationships were characterised by mutual trust, independence of the commissioning group and 
greater sharing of information (Dixon, Goodwin et al. 1998). Project managers were found to be a useful 
liaison tool between the two groups (Leese and Mahon 1999).  Historical relationships and existing 
tensions were found to be important. Where there was a history of partnership working between the 
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groups, schemes were further along (Audit Commission 2006; Audit Commission 2007). Where there 
was no tradition of working together, recognising this was the case and laying foundations for the future 
was key (Leese and Mahon 1999). High quality managerial support for clinically-led commissioning 
groups could also be enabling, both in terms of organisational development an in improving the 
attainment of objectives (Abbott, Harrison et al. 1999; Wyke, Mays et al. 1999). In all the schemes 
associated with parent bodies, relationships were said to improve and develop positively over time and 
this in itself was often listed as a successful outcome (Black, Birchall et al. 1994; Pickin and Popay 1994; 
Smith, Regen et al. 2000; Curry, Goodwin et al. 2008; Wood and Curry 2009).  
Relationship with practices 
3.7.3 Good relationships with and between practices has been cited as an enabling factor for GP-led 
commissioning (Mays, Goodwin et al. 1998). For example buy-in from rank and file GPs is thought to be 
essential in order to manage budgets effectively (Bevan, Bachmann et al. 1998). In order for larger 
groups to be successful it has been reported that all practices and non-lead GPs need to have some 
involvement (Goodwin, Mays et al. 1998). TPP work, however, showed that GPs were reluctant to work 
in large groups, especially when they were compelled to do so (Malbon (b) and Mays 1998). Under PbC, 
the formation of groups appeared to be highly dependent upon historical links between GPs (Curry, 
Goodwin et al. 2008) and formal sign up to schemes helped facilitate legitimacy (Coleman, Checkland et 
al. 2009[~]90)[~]. The section ‘links with GP practices’ above provides a comprehensive overview of 
engagement with rank and file GPs.  
External Relationships  
3.7.4 Providers: Improved relationships between GPs and hospital consultants has been hailed as one of the 
main successes of clinical commissioning (Llewellyn and Grant 1996; Ellwood 1997; Place, Posnett et al. 
1998; Wells 2010). Working collaboratively with local NHS trusts and their clinicians was seen as an 
effective way to facilitate change (Locock 1994; Gask, Donnan et al. 1998; Robison 1998; Smith, Shapiro 
et al. 1998). GPs valued the opportunity to participate in decisions related to clinical care (Fischbacher 
and francis 1998). Relational power was seen to swing towards the GPs during their time as purchasers.  
The idea of moving care out of hospital, however, made some hospital staff feel threatened and uneasy 
(Fischbacher and francis 1998; Curry, Goodwin et al. 2008). 
3.7.5 Social services: overall within the schemes, engagement with this groups was limited (Thistlewaite 1997; 
Secker, Davies et al. 2000; Audit Commission 2007). The two worlds of NHS and social services were 
said to be not understood by the other (Wyke, Myles et al. 1999). GPs also lacked trust of other 
disciplines (Goodwin, Abbott et al. 2000). TPP research revealed that collaboration between health and 
social services was improving with a move towards greater integration of care (Goodwin, Abbott et al. 
2000). This kind of inter-agency collaboration was found to aid progress (Malbon, Goodwin et al. 1999). 
Social Services representatives were board members of PCGs but this formal link was removed with the 
development of PCTs. While in some PCGs the social services representatives were able to influence 
policy decisions generally such influence was low or non-existent (Wilkin, Gillam et al. 1999). Under PbC, 
engagement with LAs was made more challenging where PbC boundaries did not coincide with LA 
boundaries (Coleman, Checkland et al 2009).  
3.7.6 Patient and public: there is little evidence to suggest that practices engaged patients and public in a 
meaningful way. Across the schemes GPs believed that by definition, they had an excellent 
understanding of patient needs and could act as reliable proxies for their patients; as a result they did not 
think of formal PPI as a priority (Dixon, Goodwin et al. 1998; Wyke, Myles et al. 1999; Coleman, 
Checkland et al. 2009). Where efforts to consult patients were made, it was often seen as a box ticking 
exercise (Dixon, Goodwin et al 1998). In PCGs, where approaches to involve patients and public had 
been initiated, this was more at the informing rather than participatory level. It has been suggested that 
PPI is relatively underdeveloped in primary care and GPs need to be educated about its value (Elbers 
and Regan 2001). 
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3.8 Conclusion 
3.8.1 The evidence on the impact of primary care-led commissioning is particularly focused on a number of 
limited areas. There is good data on what changes commissioners made to services for patients and 
areas where impact could be easily measured – such as prescribing and waiting times. We found less 
evidence on the impact of primary care-led commissioning on quality or on the impact of commissioning 
more widely. 
3.8.2 The evidence on impacts of clinically-led primary care commissioning clearly demonstrates that GPs 
focused on issues they felt were relevant for their patients and prioritised issues that mainly reflected 
perceived local needs (Dixon, Goodwin et al. 1998; Walsh, Shapiro et al. 1999). The evidence also 
suggests that there were significant tensions between tackling national priorities and addressing local 
issues.  
3.8.3 Good relationships between primary care commissioners and ‘parent body’ commissioners and 
constituent practices were critical for success. Most previous schemes (except PCTs) involved delegated 
powers or advisory status with a larger commissioning body (the HA of PCT) holding ultimate 
responsibility for commissioning local services and maintaining financial stability. Where relationships 
were good and provided a supportive and permissive context primary care commissioners were more 
likely to succeed in achieving their objectives and be more innovative. However, this success was also 
dependent on maintaining the engagement and support of constituent practices which was seen as 
important in legitimising commissioning decisions.  
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4 Discussion 
4.1 While we found 203 relevant papers discussing aspects of clinically-led commissioning, the evidence 
varies from scheme to scheme both in terms of quantity and focus. We found most papers discussed GP 
fundholding and its derivatives including TP. There was less relevant research on PCGs and PCTs, and 
only limited evidence on PbC. The pattern of evidence is likely to have been influenced partly by novelty 
– GP Fundholding was a new type of health care purchasing and the first model of primary care-led 
purchasing to be introduced in the UK. However, there was no centrally funded evaluation of GP 
fundholding unlike for TP, GP Commissioning and PbC. As such, different researchers focused on 
different aspects. However, for many early schemes the key focus was on outcomes of the schemes with 
a tendency to examine outcomes that were easy to measure – for example changes to GP prescribing 
and establishing new services. Few studies focused on how these were achieved and whether clinical 
engagement was important. 
4.2 In this review we have sought to examine how GPs and, where possible, other primary care clinicians 
were involved in commissioning and what impact this had on the outcomes. Section 2 explored the 
attitudes of clinicians towards the different schemes and their motivations for joining. Central to 
understanding clinician impact is the GP’s leadership role.  A number of studies examined what kind of 
leadership positions clinicians held within commissioning organisations, and what influence and control 
they had over commissioning decisions, the budget and the contracting process. Fewer studies explored 
the nature of the relationship between the clinical leadership and the wider clinical body.  There were also 
few studies that examined the perceived influence of the commissioning organisations over other bodies 
with which they interacted, for example the HA or provider trusts. Despite the limited amount of evidence 
in some of these areas it is clear that the degree and impact of clinical engagement varied both between 
and within different commissioning models. 
4.3 It is perhaps useful to first set out what we did not find. During the early 2000s a narrative grew up that 
one of the reasons that commissioning was deemed to have ‘failed’ was that there had been insufficient 
clinical engagement and that managers alone were unable to do the job (House of Commons Health 
Committee 2010, Smith, Curry et al 2010). Subsequent commentary surrounding the 2010 White Paper 
and later policy documents has emphasised the supposed benefits of clinical involvement in 
commissioning. It was against this background that this review was conceived, as we were concerned to 
explore how many of the claimed benefits were actually rooted in empirical evidence. It will be clear to 
readers that the impacts of clinically-led commissioning that we have identified here are somewhat more 
modest than those claimed in policy rhetoric. In part this reflects what has been studied, and in part it 
reflects the difficulty in clearly demonstrating more subtle effects on, for example, influencing colleagues 
or changing minds. Furthermore, each manifestation of clinically-led commissioning that we have looked 
at was quickly superseded by the next initiative, making it difficult to fully assess which aspects of each 
scheme were having an effect. However, it remains the case that empirical evidence of significant impact 
of clinically-led commissioning remains somewhat limited. Readers of the review may feel that what is 
presented here does not reflect their personal experience. This is because this review focuses upon the 
empirical evidence relating to clinical involvement in commissioning, which may not necessarily chime 
with individual experiences.  
4.4 There is evidence from all previous primary care-led commissioning schemes that some GPs were highly 
motivated to develop primary care-led commissioning. Key motivations were the potential for innovation 
and the development of services for their patients. The focus of such developments tended to be on 
local, community based services. Financial incentives were important in fundholding and PbC where 
savings could be reinvested in practice-based services and other service developments but this was 
more easily achieved in fundholding where practices had budgetary autonomy.  
4.5 GPs who led schemes and who were fully engaged tended to be only a small proportion of the GP body 
and many other GPs in commissioning organisations were not as engaged or were often not supportive 
of commissioning developments. However, GP leaders were generally engaged in commissioning even 
when the primary care commissioners were not the main commissioning body (eg GP Commissioning, 
PbC). In broader-based commissioning organisations such as PCTs and HAs while GPs were involved 
34 
 
these were either a very select number (eg the PEC chair and committee) or were not seen as very 
influential (eg locality commissioning). 
4.6 The evidence clearly demonstrates that GPs enjoyed more autonomy and were generally more engaged 
in GP fundholding than in later schemes. GPs had greater control over their delegated budget than in 
later schemes. Fundholding practices also tended to have strongest links between GP leaders and the 
wider body of GPs. This was partly a function of size as GP Fundholding schemes were often single 
practices or smaller networks of practices. 
4.7 We found no evidence to show whether the inclusion of non-GP clinicians added value. Some schemes 
such as PCGs included nurses but there is no research evidence reporting on any impact of this although 
nurses involved in PCGs did express the desire to become more involved on commissioning activities 
(Wilkin, Gillam et al. 1999). 
4.8 Overall the evidence on engagement suggests that while there were different degrees of engagement 
between schemes and different number of GPs and other clinicians engaged in commissioning there are 
some common themes. Essentially where GPs had more autonomy (over decisions about services, 
budgets etc) they were more likely to be innovative in terms of changes made. The ability to innovate was 
a key driving factor in motivating engagement in commissioning. Interestingly, the evidence suggests that 
where GPs who were originally non-enthusiasts of commissioning became involved in decision-making 
their commitment tended to grow. However, where autonomy was limited this limited the degree of 
influence or the extent of influence and this was likely to create less engagement by the wider body of 
GPs and clinicians.  
4.9 In Section 3 we examined the evidence on the impact of clinically-led primary care commissioning. Again 
the extent and variability of the evidence and topics examined produces a mixed picture. Areas where 
there is most evidence relates to those which were easiest to measure such as changes in prescribing, 
waiting times, referrals and specific service changes. Determining whether such changes were 
successful is more complex. Whereas reductions in prescribing costs and reduced waiting times suggest 
success, some studies raise questions about service changes where there are similar concerns about 
equity and also duplication.   
4.10 There is strong evidence to demonstrate that more GP engagement seems to lead to more success in 
achieving goals and stated objectives. This finding is supported by data from Fundholding, TP and PbC. 
These schemes demonstrate that governance systems that engage the wider body of GPs and other 
clinicians provide the commissioning organisation, and those leading it, with greater legitimacy. However, 
this increased engagement leads to increased organisational overheads and higher costs. This is 
particularly true for larger organisations with large numbers of constituent practices and GPs resulting in 
higher transaction costs. 
4.11 There is some evidence to suggest that primary care-led commissioners were innovative as a direct 
consequence of clinical engagement. However, the evidence from most schemes highlights the 
importance of the degree of control invested in the commissioning organisation. There is little evidence of 
success in changing secondary care services (Drummond, Iliffe et al. 2001; Craig, McGregor et al. 2002). 
Generally primary care clinicians focused their activities and attention on areas they were most 
knowledgeable about such as primary and community care. GPFHs focused predominantly, and most 
successfully, on changing the prescribing practices of GPs to make savings. This was an area that TPPs 
also focused on. Studies of PbC did show that wider service changes were achieved and that clinicians 
were engaged in these. However, it is not possible to ascertain the impact of such engagement although 
there is some evidence that the development of PbC provided an impetus for pushing through planned 
changes (Curry, Goodwin et al. 2008; Coleman, Checkland et al. 2009). 
4.12 For GPs there appears to be a strong incentive to make changes in services when provided with the 
power and autonomy to do so. However, these changes tend to be small, practice-based, focused on 
primary and community care services and there is little evidence to demonstrate the success of such 
schemes improved quality of care for patients or their cost-effectiveness. The evidence to date suggests 
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that very few GPs are interested in wider, large-scale, population-based commissioning. Evidence from 
TP and PbC suggests that change is more successful when GP leaders are supported by the 
membership. 
4.13 There is little evidence from previous schemes to show whether clinically-led primary care commissioners 
were more patient focused. At most the evidence suggests that GPs were more likely to respond to the 
experiences of their patients or to try to change things that they saw as affecting their patients. We found 
no evidence that primary care commissioners prioritised or developed processes for public and patient 
engagement. 
4.14 Overall clinical engagement in most schemes was driven by clinicians wanting to improve services for 
their patients. Clinicians, especially GPs, felt that they were in a better position to know what their 
patients needed. They responded to direct patient feedback on secondary and primary care services that 
patients were referred to, they felt that the information held in the practice was better than that held by 
HAs or PCTs and thus as commissioners they were better informed.  
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5 Conclusion 
5.1 In reviewing the evidence it is clear that while findings suggest that some schemes were successful, the 
variability in both quantity and quality of the research means that drawing cumulative conclusions should 
be undertaken with caution. For example while GPFHs were not constrained in their autonomy over how 
they utilised their fundholding budget their scope of action was limited in terms of their impact on 
secondary care services and patterns of care more generally. Conversely schemes that had a wider 
scope, such as TP or GP Commissioning, were constrained by the actions and degree of control 
exercised by the main commissioning organisation such as health authorities, or, in the case of PbC, the 
PCT. Research on different schemes has tended to focus on different aspects, with older research 
tending to focus on what was achieved while more recent research has explored how the organisations 
‘worked’ highlighting the shift from simply documenting impact to trying to understand how 
commissioning processes affected services for patients. This review highlights the important differences 
between schemes and therefore drawing lessons for current developments in clinically-led 
commissioning is not straightforward. Table 2 provides an overview of our review of the evidence and 
compares this with the current situation relating to CCGs. 
5.2 Despite the need for caution in interpreting the evidence a number of key themes emerged from our 
analysis. In schemes, such as GP fundholding, TP and PbC, the evidence shows that where GPs 
achieved changes they were more likely to ‘do more’ and explore further innovations and changes to 
services. Conversely in schemes where GPs felt they had little influence – such as in PCTs and to a 
certain extent in PCGs - there was a tendency to disengage. This suggests that there are virtuous cycles 
where engagement is shown to lead to successful actions and ‘vicious cycles’ where clinicians withdraw 
from engagement if they feel they have no influence. In particular, perceived success is linked to a 
willingness to accept financial responsibility for clinical decisions related to engagement with managing 
the budget. 
5.3 A key message from our analysis is that the environment and culture within which clinically-led 
commissioning organisations operate is important in determining whether they are successful.  Primary 
care commissioners in areas where there was a more permissive environment, where the HA or PCT 
provided a supportive environment, were generally more able to achieve goals, more likely to develop 
commissioning and achieve their stated objectives. Primary care commissioning organisations were 
generally more ‘successful’ when they felt they were allowed to get on with it and had freedom and 
autonomy to act. It is also true that the HA and PCT also acted as a “safety net” as they were the main 
holder of local financial risk. Therefore primary care commissioners could focus on aspects of care 
without needing to address the whole range of health issues or be ultimately responsible for health 
service delivery in the local health economy. This is clearly very different from the context within which 
CCGs will operate as they have full devolved responsibility for the delivery of health care for their 
population and are financially accountable. 
5.4 While there are some significant similarities between some previous primary care-led commissioning 
schemes and the current structure and functions of CCGs there are clearly significant differences relating 
to the role of clinicians in decision-making structures and processes, the degree of autonomy over 
commissioning decisions, the comprehensive and extent of what could be commissioned and 
relationships between different clinician groups and with external agencies. For example, CCGs will be 
similar to GPFHs as they will have full budgetary autonomy, CCGs will be commissioning a wider range 
of services. However, their autonomy may be less as they need to work with local authorities, 
Commissioning Support Services and the NHS Commissioning Board who also have commissioning 
responsibilities. Another key difference is that CCG membership is not voluntary – a distinct difference to 
the majority of preceding schemes. However, based on the findings of this review it useful to compare the 
different schemes and table 2 summarises the key characteristics of the various clinically-led primary 
care commissioning schemes comparing them with the current development of CCGs. 
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Table 2: Key characteristics of clinically-led primary care commissioning 
 
 GP 
Fundholding 
Non-
fundholding 
scheme 
(locality 
groups etc) 
Total 
purchasing 
GP 
Commissioning  
Primary 
Care 
Groups 
Primary 
Care 
Trusts 
Practice-based-
Commissioning 
Clinical 
Commissioning 
Groups 
Comprehensiveness 
of commissioning 
activity 
Limited Limited Limited Variable Fully Fully Limited Fully 
Clinical leadership High Medium High High High Low High High 
Clinical autonomy 
over commissioning 
decisions 
High Low Medium Medium Medium Low Medium Low-medium 
Budgetary 
autonomy 
Limited 
devolved 
budget 
Shadow 
budget 
Delegated 
budget 
 Shadow budget 
Delegated 
budget  
 Full 
autonomy 
Delegated 
budget 
Devolved budget 
 Financial autonomy 
in commissioning 
High Low Medium Medium Low Low Low High 
Strength of linkage/ 
relationship with 
member GPs 
High Medium Variable Variable High Low Variable 
Variable 
depending size 
and governance 
arrangements 
Strength of 
relationship with 
health 
authority/main 
commissioner 
Variable Low Variable Variable Medium N/A Variable 
New relationship 
with NHS 
Commissioning 
Board 
Strength of 
relationship with 
other organisations 
Variable Low Variable Low Medium HIgh Low  
Formal links via 
HWB 
5.5 Strong clinical leadership does not ensure the engagement of rank and file GPs and as 
commissioning organisations become larger they tend to struggle to engage clinicians from all 
constituent practices/organisations. Yet maintaining broader engagement is indicative of 
successful clinical leadership and appears to support more successful commissioning activity. 
For larger organisations maintaining such engagement is an important activity but requires 
substantial resources leading to high transaction costs.  
5.6 This review has focused specifically on exploring the impact of clinical engagement in primary 
care-led commissioning. While the evidence is variable in terms of quantity and quality we have 
identified a number of key lessons which are relevant for developing CCGs:  
 If GPs are given sufficient space to innovate, small scale change is likely (focus on issues 
close to GPs); 
 Scope to achieve change in these areas diminished over time (already focussed on); 
 In terms of service development, over time clinical commissioning models have shown that 
GPs start to engage with a wider strategic focus but initially the focus will be very localised, at 
micro and meso-levels;  
 Primary and community care are likely to be an area pinpointed for development, especially 
providing intermediate alternatives in order to reduce use of secondary care services. It is 
imperative that these changes are accompanied by resource shifts out of hospital so not 
paying for double services. Also, evaluation of new developments would be useful to see if 
they are more successful than the status quo;  
 Prescriptive guidance re membership may squeeze out GP interest and influence; 
 Cannot be sure what the added value of clinical leadership (in the wider sense) will be; 
 Grassroots engagement is key to affecting behaviour of individual GPs but mergers between 
CCGs may lead to loss of grassroots engagement. 
5.7 The review also clearly demonstrates that identifying the exact contribution that clinical 
leadership makes to commissioning is complex and it is not easily discernible exactly what added 
value clinical involvement brings. While it is possible to demonstrate some changes in 
commissioning and service provision as a result of clinical engagement there is insufficient 
evidence to demonstrate whether this had benefits for patients. Key areas of activity related to 
primary and community service change, changing prescribing practice (where significant financial 
gains were initially made) and reviewing GP referrals. There is scant evidence of any successful 
changes to secondary care. Whether there is further room for addressing GP prescribing 
practices to achieve savings is questionable.  
5.8 The findings of this review of the evidence suggest that ensuring continuing constituent support 
will be crucial in ensuring that CCGs achieve their aims and objectives. They will also require 
substantial management support and investment in internal organisational arrangements to 
ensure that clinicians are supported and engaged in the CCG.  
5.9 The evidence from previous approaches to clinically-led primary care commissioning does 
provide some key lessons for the organisation and functioning of CCGs. There are also important 
lessons regarding areas where CCGs are likely to experience significant problems and will need 
additional support. It is not possible to definitively identify what value the involvement of clinicians 
will add as this has not been uniform between schemes. However, the evidence suggests a 
general willingness among some GPs to engage in commissioning and that such engagement 
can bring about change. 
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Appendix 1: The role of GP commissioning consortia  
 
 We envisage putting GP commissioning on a statutory basis, with powers and duties set out 
in primary and secondary legislation.  
 Consortia of GP practices, working with other health and care professionals, and in 
partnership with local communities and local authorities, will commission the great majority of 
NHS services for their patients. They will not be directly responsible for commissioning 
services that GPs themselves provide, but they will become increasingly influential in driving 
up the quality of general practice. They will not commission the other family health services of 
dentistry, community pharmacy and primary ophthalmic services. These will be the 
responsibility of the NHS Commissioning Board, as will national and regional specialised 
services, although consortia will have influence and involvement.  
 The NHS Commissioning Board will calculate practice-level budgets and allocate these 
directly to consortia. The consortia will hold contracts with providers and may choose to adopt 
a lead commissioner model, for example in relation to large teaching hospitals.   
 GP consortia will include an accountable officer, and the NHS Commissioning Board will be 
responsible for holding consortia to account for stewardship of NHS resources and for the 
outcomes they achieve as commissioners. In turn, each consortium will hold its constituent 
practices to account against these objectives.  
 A fundamental principle of the new arrangements is that every GP practice will be a member 
of a consortium, as a corollary of holding a registered list of patients. Practices will have 
flexibility within the new legislative framework to form consortia in ways that they think will 
secure the best healthcare and health outcomes for their patients and locality. We envisage 
that the NHS Commissioning Board will be under a duty to establish a comprehensive system 
of GP consortia, and we envisage a reserve power for the NHS Commissioning Board to be 
able to assign practices to consortia if necessary. 
 GP consortia will need to have a sufficient geographic focus to be able to take responsibility 
for agreeing and monitoring contracts for locality-based services (such as urgent care 
services), to have responsibility for commissioning services for people who are not registered 
with a GP practice, and to commission services jointly with local authorities. The consortia will 
also need to be of sufficient size to manage financial risk and allow for accurate allocations.  
 GP consortia will be responsible for managing the combined commissioning budgets of their 
member GP practices, and using these resources to improve healthcare and health 
outcomes. The Government will discuss with the BMA and the profession how primary 
medical care contracts can best reflect new complementary responsibilities for individual GP 
practices, including being a member of a consortium and supporting the consortium in 
ensuring efficient and effective use of NHS resources.  
 GP consortia will need to have sufficient freedoms to use resources in ways that achieve the 
best and most cost-efficient outcomes for patients. Monitor and the NHS Commissioning 
Board will ensure that commissioning decisions are fair and transparent, and will promote 
competition.  
 GP consortia will have the freedom to decide what commissioning activities they undertake 
for themselves and for what activities (such as demographic analysis, contract negotiation, 
performance monitoring and aspects of financial management) they may choose to buy in 
support from external organisations, including local authorities, private and voluntary sector 
bodies.  
 We envisage that consortia will receive a maximum management allowance to reflect the 
costs associated with commissioning, with a premium for achieving high quality outcomes and 
for financial performance.  
 GP consortia will have a duty to promote equalities and to work in partnership with local 
authorities, for instance in relation to health and adult social care, early years services, public 
health, safeguarding, and the wellbeing of local populations.  
 GP consortia will have a duty of public and patient involvement, and will need to engage 
patients and the public in their neighbourhoods in the commissioning process. Through its 
local infrastructure, HealthWatch will provide evidence about local communities and their 
needs and aspirations. 
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Appendix 4: Examples of data extraction sheets 
 
Paper 16. Bain, J. (1992). "Budget holding in Calverton: one year 
on." British Medical Journal 304(6832): 971-973. 
What is the phenomenon 
being examined? 
GPFh 
At what point in time is it 
being examined? 
1992 
At what point in its life-
span is it being examined? 
A year after the introduction of GPFH 
What is the nature of the 
clinical involvement? 
GPs made decisions on where to send their patients and 
their capacity to negotiate a better deal for vulnerable 
patients 
What are the data 
collection methods? 
Not mentioned but sounds like interviews 
 
How well described are the 
processes that are being 
examined?  
Quite well described 
 
What are the descriptive 
findings? 
Progress: 
- Getting agreement on the budget was a torturous 
process. 
- The projected annual prescribing costs were higher than 
the prescribing budget so prescribing budget was 
increased. 
- The practice has not negotiated block contracts so has 
been working in cost per case basis which allows them 
greater flexibility (eg. can negotiate with the hospital if 
they are not satisfied) but leads to cumbersome 
administration as staff has to check every patient 
procedure. 
- Variation in prices for hospital procedures would 
determine where patients would be referred to. 
- Stress among staff was considerable so they organised a 
practice retreat for the partners and business manager. 
 
Improving services: 
- Started a monthly health centre based clinics in 
neurology & geriatric medicine and will introduce 
physiotherapy clinic 
- Success stories in specialties dermatology, 
ophthalmology & orthopaedics - patients travel much 
shorter distance and costs per case are notably lower 
than in one of Nottingham’s main hospital.  
- GPs have the capacity to negotiate a better deal for 
vulnerable patients – ‘hospitals now accountable to use 
as opposed to the reverse’. 
- New referrals to medical and surgical specialists have 
fallen than before fundholding. 
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- Nurses and admin staff has increased involvement in 
providing services. 
 
Problem: 
- The assumption that a business manager could take 
administrative load of medical staff was unrealistic so 
GPs cannot avoid a management role. 
- Senior partner has to be constantly available to help 
business manager/admin staff understand how hospital 
care has to be negotiated. 
- Confusion about coding – practice’s coding system for 
diagnoses and procedures didn’t match the health 
authority’s coding system. 
 
Does the paper provide 
explanations for the 
findings? 
No 
 
What inferences do the 
authors make? 
- 5 partners in the practice are not enthusiastic about the 
new GP contract and saw budget holding as having more 
control of services. 
- The objective of budget holding was to stimulate the 
practice to work within a specific allocations and make 
savings for future investment. 
What inferences do you 
make? ** 
Same as above 
 
Critical evaluation of the 
paper **  
- Based on an experience from one practice (Calverton 
practice) around 3 villages outside Nottingham so can’t 
be applied widely. 
- The progress and problems are quite well described. 
- Interviews with GPs and practice team. 
v. small but still warrant mention in Part 1 (RM) 
 
Paper  24 Bradlow 1993  BMJ 307:1186 
What is the phenomenon 
being examined? 
GPFH prescribing 
At what point in time is it 
being examined? 
1991/2 
At what point in its life-
span is it being examined? 
Early – wave 1 
What is the nature of the 
clinical involvement? 
GPFH 
What are the data 
collection methods? 
Used routine PACT data to analyse changes in prescribing 
costs. Also asked practices how they were tackling 
prescribing. Only 15 practices 
How well described are the 
processes that are being 
examined?  
Straightforward - GPFH 
What are the descriptive GPFH had the lowest rate of increase in their prescribing 
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findings? costs. This applied to both dispensing and non-dispensing 
practices. Non-fundholders started off with the lowest costs, 
but by the end had the highest costs, suggesting that this 
isn’t simply and effect of the ‘best’ practices taking up GPFH. 
Reports that GPFH reduced growth in costs by: 
 Increase in generic prescribing 
 Practice formularies 
 Advice from prescribing advisors 
Does the paper provide 
explanations for the 
findings? 
No 
What inferences do the 
authors make? 
Argues that ‘clear’ incentives involved in the scheme had an 
effect. Being a dispensing practice provides incentives not 
to prescribe generically – but it seemed that GPFH 
incentives over-rode this effect.  
What inferences do you 
make? ** 
As above 
Critical evaluation of the 
paper **  
Straightforward statistical analysis of PACT data. Relatively 
small study, with no real additional context provided, so 
unable to tell what factors contributed to success.   
Part 1 
  
Paper 44. Cowton, C. J. and J. E. Drake (1999). "Went fundholding, going 
commissioning? Some evidence-based reflections on the 
prospects for primary care groups." Public Money & Management 
19(2): 33-37. 
 
What is the phenomenon 
being examined? 
GP Fundholding practice management 
At what point in time is it 
being examined? 
1998? 
At what point in its life-span is 
it being examined? 
Spread across the waves (1-6) of fundholders. 
What is the nature of the 
clinical involvement? 
Looks at GPs (primary care) views on management roles in 
fundholding practices. Why they undertook the role? 
 
What are the data collection 
methods? 
Qualitative data collected as part of a wider project into the 
management of GP fundholding practices. 12+ practices from 4 
different HAs in N England (recruited by a variety of methods – 
leaflet response, recommendation ie opportunistic). 
Some factual info collected before interviews by a questionnaire 
(15-80 mins). 
Semi-structured interviews – 2 at each site. 
 
How well described are the 
processes that are being 
examined?  
Details provided on why the lead GP came to undertake this role. 
Each case study reported separately and then conclusions drawn 
overall. 
 
What are the descriptive 
findings? 
How individuals became lead partners in the context of their 
practice’s decision to go to fundholding – set out as individual 
case studies. 
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Decision to take the lead was secondary to the overall decision to 
go to Fundholding (ie often little ambition of lead partner to 
become a manager). 
Impression of reluctance is consistent with the many findings on 
clinical directors. 
With many practices demonstrating a lack of positive support for 
fundholding , it is not surprising that a nomination for lead was 
not always forthcoming. 
The presence of positive reasons for going to Fundholding 
doesn’t imply any one senior partner will be enthusiastic to take 
the lead role. 
Doctors can grow to appreciate a management role – new finding. 
Does the paper provide 
explanations for the findings? 
GPs as generalists or less glamorous areas of medicine , used to 
operating in partnership (as compared to secondary care) may be 
expected to take more readily to management. 
 
What inferences do the 
authors make? 
Some doctors who were initially reluctant became more keen on 
undertaking a management role once they had experienced it. 
Widespread negative belief amongst clinicians (in literature) 
about the nature of management and managers so difficult for 
them to say anything other than they did not wish to be a 
manager. 
Findings still relevant even with the announcement of demise of 
Fundholding – doctors attitudes to management roles. 
Important as this research focuses on primary not secondary care 
(important given future role of GPs on PCGs). 
 
What inferences do you 
make? ** 
 
 
Critical evaluation of the 
paper **  
Two interviews per site to avoid the views of one person only. 
Not examined the views of non-fundholders or partners not 
involved in management (as comparisons). 
Sample is not random. 
Part 1 
 
